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One of the supposed certainties of the common law is
need not pay for benefits they receive except when
persons
that
they have agreed in advance to make payment. The rule takes
many forms. One of the most familiar is the doctrine that absent
a contractual obligation, a person benefited by a volunteer
ordinarily need not pay for what he has received, This rule
supposedly both encourages economic efficiency and respects

autonomy.
To illustrate the baseline rule: While I am out of town,
my neighbor drains his swamp and in the process also dries up
the mosquito haven in my backyard. I am benefited.
Nevertheless, common law will probably require me neither to
shoulder part of the drainage costs, nor to hand over to my
neighbor any portion of the increase in land value which his
actions have given me. For me to retain the benefit, and even to
profit from it willfully, is not "unjust enrichment." Had my
neighbor desired to have me share the costs or profit with him,
he should have approached me in advance and sought my
consent, by contract.
Yet if a delivery truck hits a bump so that a bag of
valuable items tumbles out and onto my back yard, the owner
could compel me to return the bag or pay for it. I will be liable
even though I had not agreed in advance with the owner that I
would pay for the items.3 This seems an exception to the basic
rule that one need not pay for benefits except pursuant to

contract.

2

Restaremenat of Resution, section 2 (1937). It is sometimes said that when
recovery is denied, plaintiffs tend to be called "intermeddlers," but when they
win, they are more likely to be called "volunteers," Both words refer,
however, to the same basic pattern: conferring benefits on someone who has
not asked for them. This aricle uses the terms interchangeably.

3

The same puzzle recurs - but is less obvious - when I go into a store. I am
not free to take whatever I want, even though I have never agreed to the store
owner's entitlements over his goods. Robert Hale and other legal realists were
most insistent on this point. For an application of their insights to the realm of
copyright, see Wendy J. GORDON, "An Inquiry Into The Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement
Theory", (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1343 at 1422-1435 [hereinafter
w. 1 GOR DON, "Merits of Copyright"].
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The reader is probably objecting that this "exception" is
no surprise -- it is, rather, the familiar category of property. We
all know that when we "take" others' property, whether we
actively grab it or passively retain it, we usually have to either
return it or pay for it. We may even be subject to further
responsibilities, such as accounting to the owner for profits
earned by its use. In fact, another supposed baseline rule of the
common law is that to own property is to have the right to
exclude "any other individual in the universe", 4 so that any
intentional taking of another's personal property, or any
intentional crossing of a real property boundary, is prima facie
actionable. Therefore, the reader may argue, there is no
uncertainty - merely the coexistence of separate established
categories.
Yet these two categories, property and liberty, are so
familiar to us that we often overlook the extent and variability
with which one limits the other. It was in part to remedy this
frequent oversight that, shortly after the turn of the last century,
Wesley Hohfeld developed his now-famous taxonomy of legal
relations. As Hohfeld explained, "rights" and "duties" are
logical correlatives, in the sense that if someone has a "right" to
exclusive use of Blackacre, others must have a "duty" to stay
off that land. 5 Similarly, where someone has a "liberty" or
"privilege" to act, others have (as a logical correlative) "no
right" to have the government stop the action. 6 So an expansion
of property "rights" logically entails both an expansion of the
"duties", and a contraction in the "liberties", of non-owners.

4

William BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the laws of England (facsimile
1979)(1765-69), as cited and discussed in Carol M. ROSE, "Canons of
Property Talk, or, Bfackstone's Anxiety", (1988) 108 Yale LI. 601
Wesley Newcomb HOHFELD, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning", (1917) 26 Yale LI. 710, 746-747. For
discussion of the intellectual and historical context in which Hohfeld wrote,
see Joseph William SINGER, "The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld", (1982) Wis. L. Rev. 975. For an
.

ed.
5

application of the Hohfeldian categories to copyright, see Wendy J.

GORDON, "Merits of Copyright",

6

W. N. HOHFELD,

loc.

cit., note 5.

loc. cit- note 3, 1354-1378

COPYRIGHT AND PARODY

6il

"Perhaps that's so," the reader may be conceding,
"Property can limit non-owners' liberty.! But that does not
mean that liberty, in the sense of freedom from nonconsensual
obligations, is an uncertainty. It just means that liberty
principles have to be rewritten to take account of this familiar
exception." For example, the principle with which this essay
begins could be rewritten to say, "Persons need not pay for
benefits they receive except when they have in advance agreed
to pay or when the benefits constitute property owned by
others." It could further be rewritten to take account of the
nonconsensual duties imposed by the law of promissory
estoppel, by tort law, by municipal law, by restitution law, and

so on.
Unfortunately for the hope of certainty, the end result is
a vague statement somewhat like this one: "Persons need not
pay for benefits they receive except when the law says
otherwise." Further complicating matters, sometimes the law
says that property or "quasi-property" arises when one reaps
where another has sown.8
The underlying goal of the instant essay is to defamiliarize the relation of property and liberty so that the reader
can see it afresh. This journey is one that frequently recurs in
the legal literature, 9 but what this essay adds is a new itinerary.
It leads the reader away from her accustomed tangible territory
where fabled Blackacre and Whiteacre abide, into an intangible
realm sometimes known as Intellectual Property. The latter,
being less familiar than the realm of physical property, may be
more capable of being seen free of the deadening overlay of

habit.
In this realm of intangibles, we can see most vividly
how, why and where the law erodes the two supposed
certainties mentioned above: (1) the claim that persons need not

7

Milton Friedman and others have of course argued that property can function
to increase liberty as well as to limit it. But that is a different topic.

8

See International New Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)
(news items ordinarily considered in the public domain were considered
"quasi-property" when taken by a competitor).

9

See, e

g., sources

cited infra, note 11.
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pay for benefits they receive except when they have agreed to
pay, and (2) the claim that an intentional taking of personal
property, or an intentional crossing of a property boundary, is
prima facie actionable. Along the way, I hope to persuade the
reader that standards as vague as the "fairness" in "fair use" or
the "unjust" in "unjust enrichment" have both an underlying
logic and a legitimate role to play. 0 While my points are not
novel," the illustration, by means of Restitution and Copyright,
might be. Among other things, uncertainty can have particular
utility in the Intellectual Property area where the law gives
monopoly power in order to provide economic incentives for
creation.1 2 As Professors Ayres and Klemperer argue, "the last

bit of monopoly pricing provides disproportionately small
profits in comparison to its social cost",1 so that social benefit
can be significantly enhanced by legal doctrines that deprive IP
owners of the certainty needed to extract the full monopoly
price.' 4 Ayres and Klernperer explicitly recommend tempering
the reach of IP law by using open-textured standards.' 5
The essay that follows examines the boundary between
two sets of rules. The first set arises under the law of

10

Standards such as "reasonableness" or "fairness" delegate so much power to
decision-makers in individual cases that they make prediction difficult, that is,
standards produce ab ante uncertainty. A prolific literature compares and
contrasts the functions served by sharp-edged and certain rules with vaguer

standards. A wonderful window into that literature is offered by two short
pieces that introduce its major themes and do much to clarify them: Carol
ROSE, "Crystals and Mud in Property Law", (1988) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 and
Frederick SCHAUER, "Dimensions", (1997) 82 Iowa L Rev. 911.

I1

See, for example,

Iowa L.

Joan WILLIAMS, "The Rhetoric of Property", (1998) 83

Rev. 277, 278 (seeking to "defamiliarize" property notions.) The
second of the claims I investigate - the notion that property owners have a
truly exclusive dominion - has been notably subject to scholarly analysis.

See, e g, Joan WILLIAMS, supra; Carol M. ROSE, "Canons of Property
Talk, or, Blacktone's Anxiety", (1988) 108 Yale L J. 601; Frank
MICHELMAN, "Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property", (1982) 24
Nomos 3 (J. PENNOCK & J. CHAPMAN (eds)).
12

See lan AYRES and Paul KLEMPERER, "Limiting Patentees' Market Power
without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of
Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies", (1999) 97 Mich. L Rev. 985.

13

Id., at 987-988,

14

Id.

15

Id- at 1024-1026
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Restitution, particularly the rule that volunteers ordinarily need
not be rewarded. (Another way to state this same Restitution
rule is to say that the retention of benefit voluntarily conferred is
ordinarily not "unjust enrichment".) The second set of rules are
those of Intellectual Property law, which creates property in a
special kind of volunteer. My argument is simply that the law of
Restitution leads almost directly to the law of Intellectual
Property, though the two areas are premised on diametrically
opposed baseline certainties.
For simplicity's sake, the essay primarily uses one
methodology - that of economics. Of course, American and
Canadian law have many dimensions. Rules and practices are
most stable when they are supported by the convergence of
many policies, of which economics is merely one.1 6 Thus the
essay does address some additional policies, such as autonomy
and the principle of equal respect for persons, when they are
particularly apt. Nevertheless, for ease of exposition, the
economic analysis will dominate. Hopefully, it will demonstrate
both why the boundaries between liberty and property are fuzzy,
and the nature of some of the principles that help shift the
boundaries in one direction or another.
The essay then turns to examining the doctrine of
property law that the intentional crossing of a property boundary
is prima facie actionable. The essay uses three American
doctrines from intellectual property, "fair use", "the
idea/expression dichotomy", and "substantial similarity", to
demonstrate that in appropriate circumstances, even this
apparent certainty must give way.
In its final stage, the essay turns from exposition to
advocacy. I hope to persuade my Canadian readers to reconsider
the certainty with which Canadian law now favors an
established artist's interests over those of a parodist and her
audience.

16

Guido Calabresi's book TRAGIC CHOICES gives many examples that
illustrate the kind of instability, or cyclic institutional and rule changes, that
result when resource limitations make convergence of principles unavailable.
(I arm also indebted here to Randy Barnett.)
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4

Today Canada and the United States have adopted quite
opposed approaches to parody. In the U.S., the "fair use",
doctrine will often shelter a parody that embodies a substantial
portion of the work that it ridicules. This was demonstrated
vividly in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case considering
whether a rap group, "2 Live Crew" could, without permission,
lawfully record and commercially distribute a parody of the Ray
Orbison hit, "Oh, Pretty Woman."1 7 The Court remanded the
copyright owner's infringement case for further consideration,
in an opinion that stressed the open-ended nature of the fair use
doctrine.' 8 In Canada, by contrast, the doctrine of "fair dealing"
does not provide much shelter for parodies,1 9 and this hostility is
underlined by Canada's generous statutory treatment of what it

17

Lyrics of the parody included lines like, "Big hairy woman you need to shave
that stuff" and "Two timin' woman now I know the baby ain't mine." The
lyrics of both the Orbison song and the parody appear in full at Campbell v,
Acuff Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) at Appendices A and B to the
majority opinion.

18

Campbell v. A cuff Rose Music Inc., supra, note 17.

19

By contrast with the open-ended fair use doctrine of the U.S, presented at
note 54 below, the Canadian fair dealing provisions are narrow and specific,
applying only to research or private study, news reporting, and criticism or
review Not only would the copying involved in a parody likely violate an
author's ordinary rights under copyright law, but, since a parody distorts an

original work, it could also violate the right of integrity. The Canadian
provisions on fair dealing follow.
Copyright Act, R.S.C, (1985) ch. C-42, Section 29 (Can,) (as amended, 1997)
"EXCEiTIONS

Fair Dealing
Research or private study
29. Fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study does not infringe
copyright.
Criticism or review
29.1 Fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not infringe
copyright if the following are mentioned:

(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in

the

case of a performer's performance,

(iii) maker, in the case

of a sound recording, or

65
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calls the artist's "moral right of integrity". 0 Although the
Supreme Court of Canada has not addressed any case of
"parody", the Canadian fair dealing statute lays out a set of
crystalline rules into which it would be difficult to squeeze most

parody cases.
The essay elucidates an economic logic that helps to
explain the uncertain, open-ended, case-by-case treatment of the
United States courts. In the process, it is hoped that at least

(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.
News reporting
29.2 Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not infringe
copyright if the following are mentioned:
(a) the source; and
(b) if given in the source, the name of the
(i) author, in the case of a work,
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer's performance,
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal."
20

Canada's moral rights statute is part of its copyright law, and applies to
virtually any copyrighted work. Copyright Act, supra, note 19, s. 14.1.

Relevant excerpts are set forth below at note 106. Note in particular Canada's
right of integrity, which forbids alterations to a work song - that prejudice an author's reputation.

21

even a work such as a

Thus, in Cie Generale des $tablis.ements Michelmne-Michelin & CIe v.
C.A.W -Canada, (1996) 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348; 1996 CPR L EXIS 2377 (Federal
Court, Trial Division, 1996), a Canadian court imposed liability on a union for
its parodic use of a Michelin logo cartoon character as part of an organizing
campaign at a Michelin plant. The court declined to apply the reasoning of the

U.S. Supreme Court in Acuff -Rose and instead applied the Canadian statute
strictly, 17 C.P.R. at 380-385. The court contrasted the non-exhaustive nature
of the factors listed in the U.S. Fair Use provision with the hounded and rulelike Canadian approach. The court noted:
"The exceptions to acts of copyright infringement are exhaustively listed as
a closed set in sub-sections 27(2) to 27(m) and 27(3) of the [Canadian]
Copyright Act. They should be restrictively interpreted as exceptions.
[...] [P]arody does not exist as a facet of 'criticism' [...) for the purposes of
the Copyright Act." Id., at 381.
Nevertheless, the court did intimate, in dicta, that some "critical variation" of
the cartoon character might be permitted "within the context of a newspaper
or journal article" about the company whose symbol it was. IdS., at 385.

66
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some Canadians might be led to appreciate the merits of an
approach which, under the "fair use doctrine", sometimes does
allow parodies to distort copyrighted works. My argument is in
part motivated by the value that transgressive and appropriative
works bring to a culture.2 2 Nevertheless, as mentioned, in this
piece I will largely confine my analytic tools to the economic.
Intellectual property law is exciting because it is where
we can see new rights being created as we watch. It reminds us
that much of what concerns scholars comes to life daily in the

hands of judges and legislators.

I.

Goals

Western culture has long recognized the tension between
the law's need to speak clearly to cover broad classes of cases,
and the desire to do justice in the individual case. Thus, for
example, Aristotle wrote, "When the law speaks universally,
then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the
universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us
and has erred by its over-simplicity, to correct the omission
[. ]"23
Such practices are often referred to as "equitable", and
as presented by Aristotle (at least in this translation), they seem
uncontroversial. However, it over-simplifies to speak of
correcting an "omission." A judge who wants to give
individualized relief will often need to do more than merely fill

in an omitted blank. Rather, she may be called on to disregard a
law that indeed covers the case, or she may need to utilize an

22

See Rosemary Coombe's work for valuable exploration of this theme.
Rosemary I COOMBE, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, Durham,
N.C., Duke U. Press, 1998. For an introduction to my own views on the topic,
see Wendy

J.

GORDON and Sam POSTBRIEF, "On Commodifying

Intangibles", (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 135-161
(review essay); Wendy J. GORDON, "Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits:
The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship" (review

essay), (1990) 57 University of Chicago Law Review 1009-1049; Wendy J.
GORDON, "Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use', (1992) 55 Law and
Contemporary Problems 93-107.

23

ARISTOTLE, "10 Ethics", in The Nicorachean Ethics, 133, D. Ross
revised by JPL Ackrill & J.O. Urmson, Oxford, 1984.

trans.,
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equitable device (often a legal fiction such as "constructive
trust") that allows her to achieve a result contrary to what the
written rule would have led an observer to expect.
A judge can have good reason for such actions. A law
that is always applied literally can lead to results that undermine
legitimacy. Sharp-edged rules can be over-inclusive or underinclusive, and inappropriate results can be costly in both human
and economic terms.
Judge-made exceptions constitute only one route to
individualized treatment. Another route is for the legislature
itself to frame its dictates in terms of a broad standard, such as
"fairness" or "reasonableness." Similarly, the legislature can
subject hard-edged rules to an exception described by such a
broad standard. When the legislature inserts broad language
such as "fairness" into a statute, it is deliberately delegating
some of its power to the individual tribunals that will be
required to interpret the fuzzy command. Again the goal is to
avoid the costs that a more certain rule can impose when its
hard edges prove over-inclusive or under-inclusive.
But just as certainty can impose costs and threaten
legitimacy, so can equity and the use of broad standards2 4 . For
example, a regime of flexible and individualized treatment
involves not only high administrative costs, but also dangers of
bias, inconsistency, and insecurity. Just as excessive rigidity can
undermine a legal system's legitimacy, so can excessive

flexibility.
One way of potentially resolving this tension is to
regularize the grants of equitable treatment themselves. Thus,
the likelihood of individualized relief can become gradually

24

Execlent reviews of the literature appear in two short pieces: Carol M. ROSE,
"Crystals and Mud in Property Law", (1988) 40 Sian. L. Rev. 577
(distinguishing hard-edged rules, which she calls "crystals", from "fuzy,
ambiguous rules of decision", which she calls "muddy", and taking an
economic approach to analyzing their different functions), and Frederick
SCH A UER, "Prescriptions in Three Dimensions", (1997) 82 Iowa L Rev. 91 1
(sorting out the many strands of debate typically subsumed under the phrase
"rules vs. standards.") Another valuable summary is presented in Kathleen M.
SULLIVAN, "The Justices of Rules and Standards", (1992) 106 Harv. L Rev.
22, 57-69.
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more predictable. Another potential "resolution" is the so-called
free market: If property rights are well defined, individuals can
trade entitlements to suit individual needs.
In a perfect market, it is argued, all goods will flow to
their highest-valued uses by the consensual behavior of the
affected parties. Thus, when the Invisible Hand works properly,
both certainty and individuation can coexist.
Of course, the perfect market of the Invisible Hand has
virtually no counterpart in reality. In the real world, for
example, transactions are costly to consummate. Third parties
are affected by decisions in whose making they had no part.
Further, knowledge is imperfect, extreme income inequalities
abound, strategic behavior can block mutually-beneficial
coordination, and some resources cannot be commodified
without losing part or all of their value. So for these reasons
(among many others), clear-cut property rules cannot always be
relied upon. Even if one begins from neo-classical economic
premises, law might appropriately favor the use of standards as
well as sharply defined rules.
Although this essay touches on many topics, the central
problem addressed is parody: how should a copyright court
react when someone copies a copyrighted work and distorts it in
a way that ridicules the original? As already mentioned, the
approach is different in Canada and in the United States. In
Canada, the copyright owner and potential parodist know the
law contains a fairly certain rule which forbids parodies unless
the copyright owner's consent is first obtained. In the United
States, by contrast, the parties know that the situation is
governed by the uncertainties of the broad "fair use" doctrine.
Why shouldn't the copyright owner's right of control be
consistently enforced, leaving it to author and parodist to
bargain over who values the resource use more highly? That
question is addressed directly in the essay's Section IV.
Before reaching that point, the paper explores a number
of related matters. The remaining pages of Section I will briefly
summarize the primary economic goals of copyright. Sections II
and III compare "standards" with "rules" in the context of an
achieving these and related economic goals, examining
doctrines within the law of both Copyright and Restitution.
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Section IV addresses copying that is done for the purposes of
criticism and parody. The Conclusion argues that the better
approach is to utilize the broad standard of "fair use".

A.

Market failure and market success

The reader is probably familiar with the basic problem
cited as the usual justification for intellectual property regimes:
it is a form of market failure that prevents consumers from
having available as many new intellectual products as they
would be willing to pay for. Usually termed the "public goods"
problem, it is briefly described below. What is less recognized
is the fact that such market failure is only half of the
prerequisite for justifying copyright: the other requisite
condition is that there be less costly market imperfections after
intellectual property is instituted than there would have been in
the absence of the intellectual property regime.2 5

B.

Market failure in the absence of intellectual
property

"Public goods" are defined by having two
characteristics, inexhaustibility and nonexcludability. Most
intangibles have these characteristics to some extent. Intangibles
tend to be inexhaustible over a large range of utilization
(everyone can sing or play the same song, or build the same
design of engine). They also tend to be difficult for proprietors
to fence off (once encountered and remembered, anyone can
reproduce the song or design). 26 If production of a public good

25

This is explored more deeply in W. J. GORDON, "On Owning Information:

Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse", toe. cit., note

1, 230-

J.

GORDON, "Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemna in
Intellectual Property", (1990) 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853 [hereinafter W. J.
GORDON, "Asymetric Market Failure"] and Wendy J. GORDON, "Of
238; W.

Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution and Intellectual Property", toc. cit .,
note 1.
That a good is "inexhaustible" does not mean that one person's use of it will
never affect others' use. For example, at the extreme, the value of a song can
become zero through saturation-level repetition, and some exhaustible
physical products - such as plastic for a phonograph record or a radio set
may be necessary to afford access to the intangible. Practically speaking, then,
songs may not be infinitely available to all as a valuable good.
-
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is left entirely to the private market, lack of fencing can lead to
under-production, for usually a producer needs either subsidy
from government or patron, or a mode of excluding non-payors,
if he or she wishes to obtain payment for what he or she has
made. Without patronage or a mode of excluding free-riders, the
payoff from investing in creative activities will be low, and
incentives will be inadequate to induce production of as many
new intangible goods as the public would be willing to pay for.
Some public goods, such as national defense, can be
produced through use of a state apparatus3 7 This approach has
the virtue of responding to both "public goods" characteristics.
State production (1) can take advantage of inexhaustibility by
making the benefit available to all, and (2) resolves the problem
of underproduction by requiring everyone, through taxes, to

pay.
Like most nations, the United States is committed to the
belief that sole reliance on state-directed production or
bureaucratic subsidy is not the best way to produce inventions
and art. In the realm of inventions, probably the most obvious
danger of state control is the bureaucratic tendency to resist
innovation. In the realm of cultural products, the most obvious
dangers of state control are "lack of taste," 8 and the possibility
of censorship. (A history of free enterprise, of course, also plays

The same partiality characterizes an intangible's nonexcludability. Thus, for
example, though songs are easy to copy once heard, the initial score may be
easy for the composer to keep private Or the composer may be able to extract
no-copy promises from his early, small audiences, Even after a song is
popular, it may be desired in a format that favors an authorized producer's
distribution networks. See note 29 and accompanying text for more discussion

of this point.

27

The extent to which public provision of public goods is indeed necessary in
various contexts is, of course, a matter of debate. For example, Ronald Crase
has shown that although lighthouses are a classic public good (their light can
be used by a virtually unlimited number of ships within range, and no ship can
be practicably excluded from their light), some hghthouses have in fact been
built through non-governmental arrangements. See R H. COASE, "The
Lighthouse in Economics", (1974) 17 J. Law & Econ. 357.

28

Or, more precisely, there is a need for taste to evolve outside the state
apparatus in order for individuals to maintain some degree of genuine selfdetermination. See, e.g., C. Edwin BAKER, "Property and its Relation to

Constitutionally Protected Liberty", (1986) 134 U, Pa. Law Rev 741.
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a role.) Whatever the reason, there is a consensus in the United
States that a diversity of private initiatives needs to be enlisted,
and that state production - despite its ability to respond to both
inexhaustibility and nonexcludability - should not be the
primary route to follow in regard to inventions and art. As for
private subsidy through foundation and the like, support from
that sector is often unavailable or sparse.
Thus, the United States opted for primary reliance on
use of the private market to generate incentives for the
production of inventions and art. Using a market requires curing
the excludability problem. Some scholars have argued that
significant modes of exclusion are available independent of the
law.2 9 For instance, even in a legal system without copyright
(one might call such a system "copy liberty"), a writer and her
authorized publisher could obtain payment through exploiting
natural levers such as the advantage of being first in a market or
having a reputation for providing authentic, distortion-free texts.
But within the first years of the American republic, its Congress
decided 0 to provide legally enforceable rights of exclusion by
enacting intellectual property laws such as copyright and patent.
These laws give individual creative persons the right to forbid

copying3 ' of their works.

29

Scholars who are critical of copyright, or who doubt the wisdom of its
expansion, typically argue that copyright may not be necessary for creators to

obtain

.

payment for their work. See, e.g., Stephen BREYER, "The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs", (1970) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 350; Tom PALMER,
"Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach",
(1989) 12 Hmline L Rev,. 261

On the U.S. computer front, various forms of technological fences (including
cryptography) have been recently given a legal "assist" by Congress with the
adoption of the Digiral Millennium Copyright Act. Although many
technological fences are permeable to hacking, the Act makes most such
technical bypass unlawful. See 17 U.S.C. Section 1201 et sea.
30

The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright and patent "for
limited times" to further "the progress of Science and the useful arts." U.S.
Const. art. 1, paragraph 8, c. 8. Congress enacted its first copyright statute in

1790.

31

Also, American patent law prohibits even duplication of the patented
invention that happens to result from completely independent efforts.
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This right valuably supplements the author's physical
control over her manuscript. It makes publishers and
manufacturers willing to pay meaningful sums for the privilege
of copying because the exclusive right provides some protection
against unauthorized competition from outsiders.
Thus, intellectual property law responds primarily to the
second "public goods" characteristic - difficulty of fencing -and does so by altering that characteristic by legal fiat. The law
provides fences, which in turn assist the producers in capturing
for their own pockets some of the benefits their efforts generate.
The system relies on the premise that such enrichment will
induce new investment in creative endeavor and that enough
new investment will be created -investment
that would not
otherwise exist - that the value produced by this investment
will outweigh the extra administrative and other costs of the
intellectual property system.3 2

32

See William M. LANDES & Richard A. POSNER, "An Economic Analysis

of Copyright Law", (1989) 18

J. Legal Stud. 325, 326. See also Stanley I_

LIEBOWITZ, "Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination",
(1986) 8 Res L & Econ. 18 i (edited by R. Zerbe).

What matters is not the absolute level of costs involved in an intellectual
property system, but rather a comparison among

the

costs

of

the various

potential systems. Even a system of no intellectual property rights will have
significant administrative costs. Thus, assume there were a legal regime that

rejected patent and copyright and recognized only individually-negotiated
contracts as a limitation on the public's ability to copy. In such a context, for
example, inventors may spend a good deal of money on policing the secrecy
of their inventions, composers may spend a good deal of money on obtaining
contractual promises-not-to-copy from people who seek entry to concerts, and
the like.
Similarly, it should not be imagined that intellectual property rights are the
only way that costly decreases in public access occur. A regime without
intellectual property rights will afford far from unlimited access to the public.
To use the prior examples: the inventor unprotected by patent may be
unwilling to trade information with rival firms, and composers unprotected by
copyright may be unwilling to allow radios or television to broadcast their
music to general audiences.

For further analysis of the many possible alternatives to copyright law and
their costs, see W. 1 GORDON, "Merits of Copyright", loc. cit., note 3.
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C.

Success of the intellectual property market

-

An intellectual property market cannot be "perfect," if
by perfection one means a market where everyone willing to
pay more than a good's marginal cost is able to purchase the
good and where the producers' costs are also covered. No
matter how low the marginal cost of producing an extra copy of
an intangible might be - and it might be as low as zero'3
some people who are willing to pay for a copy at that level or
above will not have access to it if intellectual property law
allows producers to demand payment in excess of marginal cost.
A price above marginal cost is desirable for incentives,
for it is hoped that the price will cover research and
development expenses and induce other potential producers to
make new intangibles. Nevertheless it is clear that a right of
exclusion, although the core of intellectual property law, is only
a partial response to intangibles' public goods characteristics,
for such law leaves the public unable to take full advantage of
the inexhaustibility of intangibles. Instead, the failed promise of
inexhaustibility merely exaggerates the deadweight loss that is a
cost for all monopolies.
Thus, in addition to providing a right of exclusion, a
successful intellectual property system should also be tailored to
take as much advantage of inexhaustability as possible. If
something can be copied at no cost, there must be some
instances in which allowing free copying will be Paretosuperior)4 As will appear, the American legal system makes

of producing an extra unit of an intangible may be zero,
because of inexhaustability, or it may be some positive sum corresponding to
the cost of the intangible's physical embodiment (such as the cost of the
plastic that goes into a phonograph record).

33

The marginal cost

34

it might be

argued that in cases of true Pareto-superiority, the law would not
free copying: if the owners of the patents and
copyrights were truly unharmed by the copying (as the notion of paretosuperiority assumes), they would allow the copying to proceed without
need to provide a safe-harbor for

hindrance.
However, humans are both envious and insecure. The copyright owner might
refuse permission not because he is suffering tangible harm, but because he is
irritated that other people are getting a free ride or because he has irrational

fears about future harm. A society may well choose to consider itself entitled
to disregard envy and tnsecurity as legally relevant harms.
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some effort to recapture the lost promise of inexhaustability.
Some of these efforts take the form of "certain" and hard-edged
rules, such as the statutory provisions that place copyrights in
the public domain after a specified number of years,3 5 and some
take the form of "uncertain" or "fuzzy" doctrines such as fair

use.3 1

I.

Comparing "clear rules" with the uncertainty
of case-by-case responses

For an intellectual property regime to have even a
chance of producing more allocative gain than a "copy-liberty"
regime, the intellectual property regime must produce resource
packages that are tradable 3 7 It must also minimize its
deadweight costs and other imperfections. In the following, the
article will explore some of the devices that American copyright

In addition, attention has to be paid to defining "harm". Some cases are easy.
For example, assume that the copyist or adaptor is taking customers who
would otherwise buy or license from the author, customers who constitute part
of the very market at which the author was aiming when she set out to create

the work. It would he fairly uncontroversial to call such copying or adaptation

"harmful". Conversely, if the copyist or adaptor of the copyrighted work is
serving a market which the original author is incapable of reaching, either
directly or by licensing, then the author is not "harmed" by being denied a
right over this market Sec W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Ramax Case and Its Predecessors,"

(1982) 82 Col nbia L. Rev. 1600 (arguing that in cases of complete market
failure, where administrative costs or other problems would prevent a
copyright owner from being able to serve a given group of customers, it is
likely to be appropriate to allow "fair use" to those customers when they copy
without permission.)
Between these extremes many debatable cases exist for which there will be no
obvious answer to the question of what constitutes "harm". In such cases the
law would have to normatively decide what kind of baseline entitlement
should be secured to the author. Erosion of a relevant baseline constitutes
harm.

35

After a set number of years, all works of authorship go into the public domain,
17 U S.C. section 302-305 (duration of copyrights). Duration is discussed
nfta, at text accompanying note 90 and following.

36

The doctrine of "fair use" is discussed further at iitfia, section

37

Cf. Clifford HOLDERNESS, "A Legal Foundation for Exchange", (1985) 14
. Legal Stud 321.

IV.

COPYRIGHT AND PARODY

75

law employs to bring "success" to the intellectual property
which means keeping its imperfections to a
market -

minimum.
Some of these devices are system-wide responses.
Adjudication under sharply defined rules is sometimes
accomplished by using a "formal" approach, often associated
with the notion of "property owner as sovereign." The strict
liability aspects of copyright have this character, as will be
noted below. Copyright law also has another kind of response:
employment of open-textured standards which require case-bycase substantive inquiry. Under the latter kind of devices, a
court typically makes a substantive judgment as to the
desirability of commodifying the resource or behavior at issue,
and decides whether (if the resource is ordinarily suitable for
buying and selling) its use must be paid for by the particular
defendant in the particular context.

A.

Definitions: formal property rules as compared
with substantive reasonableness standards

In American common law, violation of most property or
personal rights will be termed a "tort."3 Yet torts themselves
tend to fall into two broad categories: intentional torts like
battery or trespass, which are ordinarily actionable without
proof that the defendant's specific behavior was socially
undesirable, and unintentional torts, which are ordinarily
actionable only if the plaintiff shows that the defendant's
behavior was negligent or otherwise unreasonable. As a matter

38

The other two types of rights that can be sued upon in American civil (non-

criminal) courts are those arising out of contract law and restitution.
"Restitution"

is

GORDON, "Of

w. J.
Harms and Benefits", loc. cit., note 1. See also Saul
concerned with benefits rather than harms. See

LEVMORE, "Explaining Restitution", (1985) 71 Va. L. Rev. 65. Like
negligence law, restitution involves a case-by-case mode of adjudication.
In restitution a person brings suit on the ground that the defendant has been
unjustly enriched and that this enrichment came either at the plaintiff's
expense or by violating some right of his. There is an obvious need for caseby-case adjudication in order to decide what enrichments are "unjust."

Restitution also functions as a remedy following on the violation of other
rights (eg., restitution may require a trespasser to return the profit he made by
trespassing on a plaintiff's land). Restitution is discussed further in this article
at Section 11, C, beginning at page 86 below.
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of categorization, the first type of tort can be viewed as
following a "property" or "formal" model and the second as
following a "nonformal tort," "reasonableness" or "substantive"
model. 9
In the "property" or "formal" model, the courts defer to
the property owner as if she were a mini-sovereign, making no
inquiry into whether the owner's decision to exclude a
defendant was proper or improper, or whether the defendant's
use of the owner's resource was harmful or productive. A
classic example under American law is trespass to land.
Someone who enters land reasonably but mistakenly thinking he
has the right to do so will be liable as a trespasser, as will
someone who entered the land out of a pressing (but not lifesaving) need for a shortcut.40 Following out the analogy to
sovereignty, the primary relevant question in these cases is
essentially jurisdictional:`' inquiring into whether the defendant
crossed a boundary over which the owner possessed an

39

1am indebted here to the work of William Powers Comparing trespass with
negligence, for example, Professor Powers notes:
"Ownership embodies a formal methodology, since [...] questions
concerning appropriate use are answered wholly by asking whether a
proposed use has been sanctioned by the owner. A decision by the
landowner [V. concludes legal debate under the ownership model. On the

other hand, a duty of reasonable use embodies a nonformal methodology

"

because it makes direct, ad hoc reference to efficiency [or other measures of
social desirability]. Under this model, a decision concerning the landowner
[...] would depend on a comparison of relative costs and benefits in the
specific case

William C. POWERS, Jr., "A Methodological Perspective on the Duty to Act"
(review essay), (1979) 57 Texas L. Rev. 523, 526-527.

40

Admittedly, even in intentional torts American courts may take cognizance of
excuses (such as incapacity) and justifications (such as necessity or selfdefense). This does not undermine the distinction between intentional and
unintentional torts, however. Not only is the burden of proving such

intentional-tort defenses typically on the defendant, but these defenses also
permit a court far less latitude than does the broad balancing of costs and
benefits which a court engages in under a reasonableness inquiry. Thus., a

person taking a shortcut through another's land can take advantage of the
necessity defense only if an imminent danger made the shortcut imperative.

41

See w. C. POWERS

Jr., loc.

cit_, note 39.
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exclusive right and did so without obtaining the owner's
consent. If so, the defendant has broken the relevant rule and is

liable.
By contrast, in the "nonformal tort" or "reasonableness"
model, a court does not assume as a prima facie matter that
deference is owed to the decisions of the property owner.
Instead, the court makes its own substantive inquiry into the
desirability of the defendant's boundary-crossing. Further, the
burden of proof will likely be placed on the plaintiff to satisfy
the court that the defendant's behavior was wrongful, and
typically wrongfulness will be defined by reference to an opentextured standard. A classic example in the United States is
negligence law: in unintentional auto accidents, unless a
defendant is found to have lacked "due care," she will not be
required to pay for the damage she caused.
American copyright law follows an uneasy middle
course between the more certain "formal" model and the less
certain "reasonableness" model. On the one hand, virtually any
unauthorized substantial copying of a protected subject matter is
subject to a prima facie prohibition. For example, even
"unconscious copying" gives rise to liability. Similarly, if a
clever plagiarist convinces a magazine publisher that a short
story is original, the publisher's good-faith belief that she had
the real author's permission to print will not help the publisher
avoid liability in a copyright infringement suit. This partakes of
a formal or "property" approach.
On the other hand, the fact-finder (usually the jury) has
both latitude and significant normative responsibility in
to
amounts
similarity
how
much
deciding
"substantiality."Although the quantity copied will be important
in the determination of substantiality, the inquiry remains
remarkably open. 42 In any case that involves other than exact

42

There are many verbal formulations as to the meaning of "substantial
similarity," also known as "illicit copying," but none does very much to define
the jury's task. Consider, for example, a classic case regarding music
infringement, Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cerl. denied
330 U.S. 851 (1947). First, the court valuably noted that, "Assuming that
adequate proof is made of copying, that is not enough; for there can be
'permissible copying,' copying which is not illicit." /d. at 472. But then it
foundered when it had to distinguish rightful from illicit copying:
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copying. a defendant will probably try to argue that his work is
not "substantially similar" to plaintiff's copyrighted work.
In addition, both American and Canadian copyright law
permit anyone to copy the "idea" from a copyrighted work, so
long as the copyist does not also borrow the work's
"expression." 3 Since no firm definition of what constitutes an
"idea" has ever evolved, the idea/expression dichotomy is fully
dependent on a judge's characterization of what constitutes an
"idea". By characterizing something as an "idea", a judge is
essentially ruling that it is something that cannot be
commodified for purposes of private ownership, but rather
should be commonly shared. No certain rule has yet been

developed capable of exhaustively defining what kinds of
human mental product should or should not be commodified. I
suggest no such "rule" is even possible.
Most of the literature on commodification admits the

difficulty of the questions raised.'4 Thus, consider SPHERES

OF JUSTICE, where Michael Walzer makes a convincing case
(if one were needed) that monetary criteria should not rule all
spheres. Some goods - such as political office, artistic prestige,
basic human dignity - should not be made into commodities
for purchase and sale," 5 But Walzer is less clear about what

on that issue [...] is whether defendant took from
plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners,
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that
the defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff."

"The proper criterion

Id, at 473.
Aside from the reference to the lay (non-expert) audience, this formulation
offers no more than vague references to quantity ("so much"), to market

value, and to a conclusory notion of wrongfulness.
43

In American copyright law, this principle appears explicitly in the statute. 17
U.S.C. Section 102. Canadian doctrine is so similar that an overview of
Canadian law makes reference to the U.S. statute to explain the principle.
Lesley Ellen HARRIS, Canadian Copyright Law, 2nd ed , Ontario, 1995, at

16.

44

Sec, e.g., Margaret Jane RADIN, Contested Comnnodities, Cambridge,
Harvard U. Press, 196 (particularly her discussion of the "double bind,").

45

Cf Michael WALZER, Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and
equality, New York, Basic Books (arguing that money should not to dominate
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institutions should mediate society's difficult choices over what
behaviors and resources should be placed in the market sphere,
and what behaviors and resources should be governed by nonmarket criteria.
One institutional possibility is for the legislature to set
out particular rules, and then for that same legislature to change
the rules as circumstances change, or as particular norms come
under pressure. This has occurred. Thus, United States rules on
conscription have changed and changed again, including at
several points a rule of commodification: under the nation's first
conscription law, a draftee could lawfully "hire a substitute in
his place." 4 6 Under a succeeding statute, Congress "set a flat fee
of $ 300 for exemption from induction." 4 7 Later, of course, such
monetary exemptions became anathema, and successive rule
changes gave other criteria (consider, e.g., educational
deferments from the draft) their chance at being a governing

norm.
But such rule changes take time to implement. Arguably,
the technology that drives modern copyright markets changes
too fast - and arguably, the norms concerned are so subtle and
the dynamics of power politics too insensitive to the public
to rely on legislative rule-making and ruleinterest4 8 changing as an optimal route for defining the boundaries
between the market and non-market alternatives.
A perhaps preferable institutional possibility is for the
legislature to adopt vague standards. As has been often noted,
vagueness delegates to other decision-makers (largely judges)
the power to fill in the details. Congress chose this route when it

all spheres of life, and that some way must be found to distinguish the
monetary sphere from spheres where other values should predominate.)
46

Guido CALABRESI and Philip BOBBITT, Tragic Choices, New York, W.W.

Norton & Co.,

1978, at 159.

47

Id , at 160.

48

Jessica Litman's studies of the legislative process in the recent U.S. Copyright
arena suggest that it has served private interests much more consistently than
it has the publc interest. See, e.g., Jessica D. LITMAN, "Copyright
Legislation and Technological change", (1989) 68 Or. L. Rev. 275; Jessica D.
LITMAN, "Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History", (1987) 72

Cornell L. Rev. 857. This is likely to lead to over-commodification.
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declared that "ideas" cannot be owned in copyright law. 49
without ever defining what constitutes an "idea". As a result,
shifting norms and facts have fed into judges' conceptions of
what should be declared an "idea" and thus placed outside the
bounds of copyright ownership.
An example of judges' shifting instincts on this issue can
be seen in their treatment of whether "compatibility standards"
in the computer field can be protected by copyright. At one
point, a defendant was ridiculed for claiming that he should be
entitled to copy whatever was essential to the "idea" of
producing a computer capable of running standard Apple
programs. That was not an "idea", said the Court.5 More
recently, a court to the contrary indicated that a defendant is free
to copy "elements that might have been dictated by external
factors,"" including elements needed to achieve compatibility
with "other programs with which [the defendant's program] was
designed to interact." Such elements were not ownable
expression. Presumably the courts were influenced by shifts in
the computer industry, and a growing recognition of the social
benefit to be gained from fostering network externalities. 2

49

17 U.S.C. Section 102(b),

50

The court wrote: "Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with
independently developed application programs written for the Apple 11, but
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the
somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions
have merged." Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer C'orp., 714 F. 2d
1240 ( 3rd Cir, 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The Apple II
operating system was a competitor of the now-dominant DOS system.

51

Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (1992).
Note, however, that this was not explicitly a holding on what was or was not
an "idea"

52

Basically, if a network grows more valuable to each member when additonal
members join, then each new member is said to confer an "external benefit"
on the existing membership. There is a growing literature applying network
externahty analysis to the computer field.

For example, if I use a WINDOWS operating system, I will be better off if
many other people also use the same system. The more people who use
WINDOWS, the more application programs will be written for WINDOWS
and thus for me; also, the more people who use WINDOWS, the more easily I
can communicate with other computer users. Each additional person who buys
and installs a WINDOWS operating system thus confers a benefit on me,
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Even in cases where a defendant has committed
"substantial" copying of "expression", he remains able to call
upon another important but "muddy" 53 standard in American
copyright law: the doctrine of "fair use". A defendant will have
no liability for making a copy which is "fair" in her particular
circumstances. 54 The fair use defense essentially draws the court
into deciding the social desirability of the defendant's copying.
Although the fair use doctrine appears in the Copyright
Act, that statute declines to set out any definite strictures.55

53

The imagery of "mud" for standards and "crystal" for rules originates in C. M.

ROSE, foc. cit., note 10.
54

See

17

U.S.C. Section

follows:

107.

As originally enacted, section 107 provided

as

"107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [which set out a copyright

owner's

exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, public performance,
and the like], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
-

considered shall include

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for

or

value of the

copyrighted work."
17 U.S.C. Section 107 (1976). The section was recently amended to make

clear that the unpublished status of a work should not be determinative.
For my further examinations of the doctrine, see, e.g., W. J. GORDON, "Fair
Use as Market Failure", loc. cit., note 34, (using an economic model to unify
fair use cases and give some precision to the notoriously open-ended
doctrine). See also Wendy J. GORDON, "A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property", (1993) 102 Yale L 1533 [hereinafter W. J. GORDON, "Property
Right in Self-Expression"]; W. J. GORDON, "Reality as Artifact: From Feist
to Fair Use", loc. cit., note 22.

55

The legislative history of section 107 indicates that, despite the statutory
recognition accorded fair use, the nature of the doctrine remains to be defined
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Formal line-drawing is rejected. As the legislative history
recounts, "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no
generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising
the question must be decided on its own facts." 6 At one point it
seemed that the Supreme Court was willing to bring a bit more
certainty to the doctrine, for one majority opinion seemed to
declare that any commercial use is presumptively unfair, or at
least that one of the fair use factors would be presumptively
resolved against the defendant. 57 More recently, however, in the
context of a commercial parody, the Supreme Court
reinterpreted its prior statement and wrote that "no such
evidentiary presumption is available." 5 8 Similarly, when a
Supreme Court opinions" was applied as if it had adopted a rule
making fair use unavailable for unpublished works, the
Congress responded by amending the fair use statute to specify
that the unpublished nature of a plaintiff's work was only one
factor among many. 60 Thus, both the Court and Congress have
shown a deliberate preference for an equitable standard over
specific rules.

by case law: "The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial
doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the statute [... "IR.
Rep. No. 941476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 5680
[hereinafter House Reportl. See also S. Rep. No. 94-473, 1st Sess, 62 (1975)

[Senate Report]. The courts have recognized their freedom to continue the
development of fair use doctrine, See, e.g., Triangle Publictions Inc. v,
Knight-Ridder Newspapers Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir 1980)
("Congress made clear that it in no way intended to depart from Court-created

principles or to short-circuit further judicial development [...?").
56

House Report at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.SC.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.

57

Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. The fourth fair use factor is "the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work," sec 107(4). In
regard to that factor, the Court indicated that a likelihood of future harm to a

58

plaintiff could be presumed from the commerciality of a defendant's use. Id.
Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music /nc., supra, note 17, at the last page of the
opinion. The Court at one stage of the Campbell opinion distinguished Sony
on the ground that Sony involved "mere duplication for commercial purposes"
while Campbell involved a transformative use, namely a parody. But the
overall tenor of the opinion went beyond that distinction to reject the notion of
certain and sharp rules in fair use.

59
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Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539 (1985).
17 U.S.C. Section 107, last sentence.
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Copyright's unusual mid-range status

At first blush, it is surprising to find American copyright
law placing at the virtual center of a plaintiff's case the
distinctively nonformal principles of "substantiality" and
"fairness." After all, copyright is a form of property, and
copyists always act volitionally and deliberately. (For example,
they know they are publicly performing, or using the photocopy
machine, or playing music on their guitar, even if they don't
know that they are copying someone else while doing so.) It
seems most logical that such a volitional trespass should be
treated under a formal rule, as are other non-accidental
violations of property rights. The mere act of nonconsensual
copying is arguably like the mere act of stepping onto someone
else's land without permission, and arguably should give rise to
similar liability. So why is this not the case?
Economics does not yield an immediate answer. The
classic article by Calabresi and Melamedl tells us that
intentional takings of property are prima facie wrongful because
people should not depart from the market without a strong
justification. Their article tells us that accident law uses a
"reasonableness" inquiry because, in accidents, such a
justification is present: the participants cannot bargain with each
other in advance. Before a driver chooses to drive down a
particular street at 35 miles per hour, neither she nor the
pedestrian with whom she may accidentally collide on that
street, has any reason to know that they need to deal with each
other. In the presence of such complete market failure, we are
told, the court "mimics the market" through a negligence
inquiry, trying to determine whether the parties behaved

efficiently and imposing liability accordingly.
But in copyright the "substantiality" inquiry and the
"fair use" doctrine are both available regardless of whether the
copyright owner and the copyist have complete knowledge of
each other's identity and are otherwise able to bargain. Thus, in
the most recent "fair use" case to reach the United States
Supreme Court, the parties had the requisite knowledge and

61

See Guido CALABRESI & A. Douglas MELAMED, "Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral", (1975) 85
Harv. L. Rev. 1089.
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transaction costs were minimal. Defendant, the rap group "2
Live Crew," had in fact offered the copyright owners
compensation in exchange for permission to make a parody of
their song, "Oh, Pretty Woman." The copyright owners simply
refused to give the rap group permission.
This hardly looks like market failure -- the two parties
were virtually face to face. Yet the Supreme Court indicated that
fair use might nevertheless be available to shield the makers of
6 How, then, can such
the parody from liability."
a doctrine be
squared, either with usual American patterns of tort and
property law, or with economic notions of market failure?
The answer lies in the imperfection of intellectual
property as a response to the "public goods" problem. At least
in the absence of perfect price discrimination, 63 obtaining
adequate incentives for production will necessarily involve a
price that is set above marginal cost, and thus a quantity
produced that is below the quantity that would be produced by a
competitive market. Market imperfection is present in even the
most pristine copyright transaction. The issue is how legal
institutions cure the imperfections caused by excludability
without losing the benefits excludability brings.

Or, one can put the same matter in non-economic
normative terms. Copying is not necessarily wrongful. It is how

62

See Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music inc., supra, note 17 The case was
remanded for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court opinion that,
inter alia, made clear the copyright owner's refusing to license should not
weigh against a fair use finding. See id. (parodists are unlikely to be able to
obtain consents). See also id. at 585 n. S ("we reject Acuff Rose's argument
that 2 Live Crew's request for permission to use the original should be
weighed against a fair use finding.").

63

See Harold DEMSETZ, "The Private Production of Public Goods", (1970) 13
JL & Econ. 293. Copyright itself can be seen as enabling a form of price
discrimination. See Wendy J. GORDON, "Intellectual Property as Price
Discrimination: implications for Contract," (1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law
Review 1367; also see Michael J. MEURER, "Price Discrimination, Personal
Use and Privacy: Copyright Protection of Digital works," (1997) 45 Buff L
Rev. 845
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we learn, 64 it can be both harmless and beneficial,6 5 and it is the
essence of having a common culture. 66 Therefore it would be
absurd to make all copiers prima facie liable as infringers.
The trick is to find some means to distinguish wrongful
from fair copying. Some of those means are case-by-case, like
"substantial similarity" and "fair use." Some are system-wide
rules, like the provisions limiting the duration of copyrights and

patents.
But the use of vague standards is probably what stands
most in need of explanation. The employment of these standards
is, in my view, largely due to the lost promise of
inexhaustability, coupled with the speed of technological
change that characterizes the copyright industries in the last
century. Since copying of an intangible is often harmless, a "fair
use" and "substantial similarity" standard permit socially useful
experimentation. And since such experimentation may be
blocked by transaction costs, and these costs can change
quickly, "fair use" allows the courts to adapt.6 7

64

See Benjamin KAPLAN, An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967).

65

If copying

66

See W.

67

GORDON, loc. cit., note 34 at 1656-1657; also see American
W.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc , 60 F 3d 913 (2d Cir 1995), cert. denied
516 S Ct 1005 (1995) (photocopying held not fair use because, inter alia,
licensing through the Copyright Clearance Center would have been feasible).

is harmless, allowing copying produces a Pareto-superior result: no
one is hurt and the copyist and her customers gain.

J. GORDON, "On Owning Information : Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse", boc. ci;., note 1; w,.1J. GORDON, "Properly Right in
Self-Expression", o. cit'., note 54.

J.

Note, moreover, that transaction cost barriers between copier and copyright
owner are only one of many forms of market failure relevant to fair use. For
example, uses such as criticism generate positive externalities, and this is one
reason why a critic's extensive use of quotation is potentially entitled to fair

use treatment, "Fair Use as Market Failure," at 1630-1631, Further, "fair use"
is also used to address uses that should not be owned (or commodified) at all,
id. at 1631-1632, such as uses that implicate non-monetizable free speech
corcerns.
The importance of providing a safe harbor for critics may be obvious and
stable enough to be recognized in a rule, as the Canadian "fair dealing" statute
has done. But is is not so easy to reduce to a rule the many ways in which the
"fair use" doctrine can be used to investigate issues such as non-

monetizability of the interests at stake in a particular case. When the question
before the court is the normative inapplicability of the whole market

86

LES CERTITUDES DU DROIT -

CERTAINTY AND THE LAW

All that being said, however, it is still true that
Copyright law places on the public a duty to refrain from certain
uses of others' labor, while Restitution takes the opposite
starting point. It will be useful to employ basic economics to
understand why Copyright law begins with a presumption of
liability (subject to an equitably-expressed exception for "fair"
uses) while Restitution begins with a presumption of no liability
(subject to an equitably-expressed exception for "unjust"
enrichment).

C.

Comparing Copyright and Restitution

Restitution doctrine provides that persons whose labor
makes others better off will ordinarily have no legal recourse if
they labor without advance agreement. Yet intellectual product
producers can sue to obtain payment for the "fruits of their
labor" from copyists who never agreed to pay. This has led
some observers to view some forms of intellectual property as
unjustifiable. 8 Since Restitution law contains no presumption
that there should be recovery for benefits generated, it forms a
useful contrast with copyright.69
First, consider a homely example to illustrate the
different treatment a laborer without a contract will receive
under the two areas of law. First, imagine someone paints the
roof of a building while its owner is away. After the owner

apparatus, a flexible standard is (I
a societal consensus has formed.

argue) the

best way to proceed, at

least until

Note that the issues embraced by "fair use" cases can include issues of

commodificaiton. This essay broached those issues earlier, in relation to the
statutory declaration that "ideas" cannot be owned under United States
copyright law. 17 U.SC. Section 102(b). In the middle of the century, the
overlap between "fair use" and the non-ownership of "ideas" was visible in
the language courts used, for a defendant who used a copyright owner's
"ideas" was said to be engaged in a "fair use".

68

Thus Murray Rothbard argues that intellectual property is legitimate only to
the extent that it can be

analogized

to consent See Murray N. ROTIHBARD,

Man, Economy and State. A Treatise on Economic Principles, Auburn,
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2nd ed., 1993, 652-660 (1962),
69

Under American copyright law, the work's creator has a right to exclusively

control the rights of reproduction, copying, adaptation, performance and the
like, see 17 U.S.C. Section 106. She can extract monies and obtain injunctions
when someone does these things without permissionw
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returns the painter presents himself at the door and says, "pay
me for this wonderful benefit I have given you," pointing at the
new paint job which (we will assume) has increased the value of
the building. In such a situation, the building owner is entitled to
say something quite rude. Next, in contrast, imagine that the
home owner, using her own sweat and paint, does a mural on
one of her building's exterior walls, copying onto it a painting
which has a valid copyright. Perhaps the mural increases the
value of the building more than a new coat of pure white paint
would have; perhaps the mural is an eyesore. In either event, if
the owner of the copyright comes to the door and says, "Pay me
or I'm going to sue you for a very large amount of money," the
building owner had better be very polite.
In neither situation has the building owner agreed in
advance to pay for use of the other's resource. Yet the
photographer's labor embedded in a visual pattern must be paid
for, and the painter's labor embedded in new roof pigment need
not be.
Do not jump too quickly to say that one of the pigments
embodies property while the other merely embodies labor.
Pretend for a moment there is no property in pictures, and that
we have to return to basic common-law techniques to determine
whether or not the author of the copied picture should be paid.
To prevail in Restitution, persons whose voluntary
actions provide benefits to others must ordinarily show one of a
few very narrow justifications for departing from the market:
mistake, 70 coercion, 7' request,7 2 or a narrow range of exigent
situations, such as danger to life and health.' 3 Even then, their
ability to recover will often be further restricted by the courts'
desire to be sure that the defendant really was benefited and that
forcing him to pay or disgorge will not leave him worse off than
he would have been in the status quo ante. 7 4 Similarly, the

70

Restatement ofRestituion, supra, note 2, Sections 6-69.

71

Id., Sections 70-106.

72

Id., Sections

73

Id, Section 112.

74

see, eg 1d Section 40, ernt b, at 109.

107-111.
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Restatement of Restitution is not hospitable to persons who
generate benefits as a by-product of self-serving activity. Thus,
the Restatement states that: "A person who, incidentally to the
performance of his own duty or to the protection or
improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon
another, is not thereby entitled to contribution." 5 For example,
a mine owner whose drainage efforts clear both her mine and
her neighbor's mine of waters is not entitled to contribution
from the neighbor. 76
A person who writes a book and publishes it is certainly
operating in the furtherance of his or her own interests. Except
as to someone who has bargained with the author for production
of the work (such as a patron, granting agency, employer, or
contract-publisher), the author is a sort of volunteer. She is
voluntarily taking the risk that putting her product on the market
will bring her a profit. When a book is mass-marketed, many
strangers will come across it. If a stranger makes copies of the
book for sale, copyright law will give the author a right of
action against the copyist even if the author "volunteered" to
send the work into the stream of commerce. Since that right of
action will be available whether or not the copyist had a contract
with the author promising to refrain from copying, and whether
or not the copyist's actions harm the author, 7 it is clear that,
under copyright law, a unilateral transfer of "benefits" will

trigger liability.
There are many reasons for the difference between
two fields' basic rules; one difference obviously lies in
active or passive role of the person using the benefit. That is
simply an issue of autonomy. Activity or passivity also

75

the
the
not
has

Id., supra, note 43, Section 106. There are situations in which protecting
one's own interests does not bar restitution, but these tend to be associated
with coercion, as where a property owner discharges another's duty when that

is the only way to prevent a third party from lawfully taking the property.
Section 103.

Id.,

76

Id., Section 106, illus. 2. The result in this situation may vary if the neighbor
can be said to have "freely accepted" the benefit. See Peter BIRKS,
/nsroducion to the Law of Restitution.

77

Sometimes the absence of harm may make it easier to obtain fair use
treatment, however, See the fourth factor in 17 U.S.C. section 107, set out at
footnote 54.
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implications for market formation. To see this, consider what
results would follow if a legally enforced right to payment were
given to the claimants in the two situations.
In the Restitution context, the active parties are the
benefactors, the volunteers. Systematically allowing volunteers
to sue for the benefits they have given would reduce their desire
to make contracts with those who might want their services.
Admittedly, the people who are the best at painting houses
would have no desire to sneak around and do it behind the backs
of their customers. However, the people who make messy jobs
of it would probably start to paint and then ask for money after
the fact - and could do so in disregard of whether the building
owner preferred a different supplier, thus ruining the market
even for those who would otherwise be willing to make
contracts. In the volunteer context, then, a rule that encourages
contract formation - and thus market formation - is a rule
that denies to the benefit-generator (the potential volunteer) any
right of recompense independent of contract.78 If a volunteer
thinks the law will not give restitution, then she will seek to
make a bargain by asking the potential recipients for
contributions before the project begins.7 9

78

Even when there is a market failure in the restitution context, so that the
potential benefactor and the potential recipient are unable to identify or
negotiate with each other, there are only very few circumstances in which
payment is ordered through the courts - mistake, request, coercion and a
narrow range of emergencies justify recovery. This narrowness of recovery in
the restitution context reflects the fact that if we give the benefit-generator a

right to legally enforce recompense, it would tend to erode markets. See
LEVMORE, toe. cit., note 38.
79

Many examples exist of "internalizing benefits" by contract. Thus, in many
shopping malls, where small stores are likely to benefit from the propinquity
of large department stores that draw masses of customers, the small stores

may be willing to pay extra rent to subsidize the larger stores' entry.
Something like this also happens in oil exploration: neighboring lessees will
learn a great deal about whether or not it is worthwhile to drill under their own

land from the results of their neighbor's drilling. So "dry hole contribution
agreements" have come into being: contracts by which the neighbor who
stands to benefit from the information agrees to pay a share of his neighbor's

drilling costs should the hole come up dry.
Similarly, assume that landowners are likely to benefit from a venture like a
resort complex locating nearby, but the resort is so expensive to build that it
cannot afford many externalized benefits - e.g., it will come to the area only

if

it is subsidized by the existing landowners or can itself capture most of the
benefits generated. Even in such a case there may be no need to allow the
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In the intellectual property context, the likely impact of a
right to recover is quite the opposite.8 This occurs largely
because the identity of the active party - and thus the party
who has superior access to information, who is otherwise better
able to enter transactions, and who is better situated to respond
to the law's messages - is different there.
In the volunteer context, the recipient may be ignorant
until the deed is done. It is the benefactor - like the house
painter - who has the greater access to information; he knows
where and when he will act. In restitution, the rule of law that
speaks to this active party and encourages him to seek out
consensual market arrangements is therefore a rule of "no
monetary recovery without contract." In the intellectual
property situation, by contrast, the recipient-copyist is the active
party: he can better initiate the transaction. After all, the copyist
knows what he is copying, whereas the plaintiff-owner may be
hundreds of miles away and have no idea copying is being
contemplated. The copyist will also find it fairly easy to identify
the author or copyright owner from the by-line, while the
copyright owner has no such source of information.

'

Even if the author can identify the potential copyists, she
faces strong strategic behavior problems in making them pay. 8

resort complex to sue the benefited owners, after the fact, in restitution. The
developers can try to persuade these neighbors, in advance, to pay them
something to encourage them to build nearby, Admittedly, there could be
hold-out problems and other strategic maneuvering making this difficult, So
the active party has another option: the owner of an attraction could quietly
buy the land on which the beneficial spillovers will fall. This is apparently
what the Disney organization did with Epcot and Disney World: it bought up
surrounding land and built on it enough hotels and restaurants to capture much
of the benefit their tourist attraction generates. where this is possible, benefits
are again internalized without the need for restitution suits.
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This is explored at greater length in W J. GORDON, "Of Harms and
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property". foc. cit., note and in

1,

W, J. GORDON, "On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse", Io. cit., note 1.

81

Ina world without intellectual property rights, an author may want to bargain
with her audience for payment, but the audience is likely to be a wide and
uncertain one, and the benefits are those that will flow from an as yet
undisclosed intellectual product. Even if the author could somehow identify

all the potential recipients, it would be expensive and awkward to reach
simultaneously all of the persons who will eventually want access to the work.
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A baseline rule that denied copyright - that gave a benefitgenerator no recovery unless he had a prior contract with the
copyist -- would leave the party with the best ability to contract
(the copyist) with little motive to do so. He would probably
prefer to free ride. Therefore, the law has to give the benefitgenerators (the copyright owners) a right of recovery
independent of contract.
Both restitution and intellectual property law give the
party who has the information and ability to internalize the
incentive to do so. The party simply happens to be different in
restitution than in intellectual property. In each case, legal rights
are arranged to facilitate the consensual transfers of resources.

Even if this were possible, what would happen when the creator tried to

negotiate for a payment from them all in exchange for disclosing the work?
Many of those audience members might be tempted to hold back in the hope

that others' monies would

he sufficient to draw the work into the marketplace

where they could then make a cheap copy. The larger the group of potential
purchasers, the better the odds on the gamble may seem. Also, the work's
contents are largely unknown at this stage; the less certain the benefits, the
less seems to be risked if the gamble does not pay off. Good odds in favor of
winning, and low perceived cast in the event of a loss, make the gamble very
tempting. If enough people take this gamble in the hope of taking a free ride,
the requisite funds may not be forthcoming. "Chicken," "prisoner's dilemma,"

and other free rider games illustrate analogous dynamics.
The presence of a publisher does not much alter the desirability of granting

intellectual property rights to resolve potential bargaining stalemates.
Admittedly, in a world without intellectual property rights the author may find
it easier to deal with a publisher than with an undifferentiated audience (only
one party; low transaction costs), but then the publisher must deal with the
audience. The author's problems with information, transaction costs, and free
riders would simply be passed on, one step further down the line. How much

would a publisher pay for a book that could be lawfully copied by all corners
once it appeared on the market? Unless the publisher has a lead-time

advantage or some other sort of real-world clout that can discourage copying,
the rate the publisher would offer the author in such a world might be too low.
If the anticipated rate of payment is low, otherwise-desirable works may not
be created.
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The party best positioned to alter the use to which a resource is
puts 2 is required to do so by a systemic choice of a liability or
no-liability rule'
The centerpoint of intellectual property liability appears
in the copyright and patent statutes as a grant to the proprietor
of rights to exclusive uses' Note that the rule setting up liability
appears to be a sharp-edged and certain grant. As with all sharpedged rules, it may be over-inclusive. Thus, although the
rationale of the rule depends on the potential printer or copyist
being an active party who can knowledgeably seek out bargains,

copyright law also makes a publisher liable if, in good faith, she

prints a copyrighted work which a plagiarizer has submitted.
The law might even make a passive recipient liable. For
example, assume that a painting duplicating a copyrighted work
is put on the exterior wall of a house not by the building's
owner, but by a skilled prankster. In that case, the householder
is a passive recipient, rather than an active user (as is more
typical in intellectual property cases). Nevertheless, he may be
liable. Assume for example that the reproduction draws
attention to the house so that the householder can sell the
building for an amount in excess of the value of otherwise
similar homes. If the owner in fact does sell, he will likely be
guilty of infringing the copyright owner's exclusive rights over
the distribution of copies.' Such over-inclusion can be costly.
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This is a variation of the phenomenon Dean Calabresi referred to as looking

for the "best briber." Guido CALABRESI, The Costs of A ccidens; a legal and
economic analysis, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.

83

Markets can yield efficiency only where resources can practicably be
transferred to their highest-valued uses. See R, H. COASE, "The Problem of
Social Cost", (1960) 3 J. L. & Econ, 1,

84

For copyright law in the U.S., see 17 U.S.C. Section 106 (giving exclusive
rights over the reproduction, distribution, public performance, adaptation, etc.,
of the copyrighted work of authorship); for patent law in the U.S., see 35
U.S.C. Sections 101 et sCq. (giving exclusive rights over making, using,

selling, offering to sell, or importing,

85

the patented invention.)

Under section 106(3), only the owner of the copyright has the right to
distribute copies. Although the first sale doctrine (see section 109) provides an
exception that allows the owners of lawfully made copies to distribute them
without liability, the house owner in our example does not own a copy that
was "lawfully made". Therefore he could not take shelter under the first sale
doctrine, and his sale of the house would constitute an unlawful "distribution"
of the copy painted upon it
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Systemic intellectual property rules to
minimize market imperfections

Rules are not only used to enhance tradability. They are
also used to distinguish between areas where legal protection is
desirable and areas in which it is not. Industries may exist where
perhaps the need for government to provide exclusion rights is
less (because there is no significant market failure under copyliberty), or uses which are more expensive to restrict, or other
areas where the costs of copyright might outweigh its value.
Thus, copyright distinguishes among subject matters. Not all
beneficial products of human ingenuity are capable of being
owned. Differing treatment exists for computer programs,
musical compositions, literary works, architecture, recorded oral
presentations - each has some specialized rules in the statute.
Further the Copyright Act grants ownership only in works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, 86 and even
among such works the act denies protection to whole classes
(such as ideas, and typographic designs)s which, presumably,
would prove more costly than beneficial to propertize. 8 8
Similarly, copyright does not give owners of copyright a right to
control all uses of their works. Rather, they have control over
certain kinds of enumerated uses -- those uses whose control is

Public display is also one of the copyright owner's exclusive entitlements. 17
U.S.C. Section 106(5). Even without a sale, it is possible that an irritated
copyright owner could bring a successful suit merely for the house owner's
continued "public display" of the work. However, I suspect that, in such a
case, a court might read into the copyright statute a requirement that the
defendant act volitionally. (A suit premised on sale of the house - sale being
a volitional act - would not be as vulnerable.)

86
'7

See, e

17 U.S-C. Sections 102, 103.

Section 102(6) denies copyright to, inter alia, ideas and processes. As for
typographic designs lacking protection, this is a matter of legislative history;

the statute itself does not explicitly mention typography. See House Report,
supra, note 55, at 53-57. The reason protection was not given to typographic
design may have been a fear that such protection might be misused by
reprinters as a way to fence off public domain literature such as Shakespeare

or the Bible.
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lndustry pressures undoubtedly play a role here as well.
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desirably centralized in one entity. Thus, for example, the
composer of a song has exclusive rights over reproduction and
public performance, but not over private performance. 89
There are also system-wide rules that work to decrease
the system's costs, and to take better advantage of intangibles'
inexhaustability. The key example here is that of duration.90
To see this, we must backtrack to consider a conceptual
matter. At one point, lawyers foundered when asked how to
assess, even conceptually, the value of an intellectual property
system. The empirical questions are hard enough, but there
appeared to be a paradox where deadweight loss was concerned.
True, the exclusive right that the copyright or patent owner
receives from the law confers a kind of monopoly power (of
varying effectiveness, depending on the competing intellectual
products available to the audience.) 9l Also true, this monopoly
power can then cause deadweight loss as the intellectual
property owner imposes a price above marginal cost and the
quantity effectively available to the public is reduced. But
lawyers were hard put to assess the significance of this
deadweight loss, because the work to which access was being
reduced by the intellectual property law might never have come
into existence without that very law.
The way out of this apparent paradox was to make a
conceptual distinction between those works which needed the
intellectual property law to induce their authors to create them,
and those works which did not. As to the former items, any
production is due to the legal regime's grant of intellectual
property rights. As to the latter items, the intellectual property
law merely functions as a restriction. 9 2

89

For more on the role of copyright's particular provisions, see W. . GORDON,
"Merits of Copyright", loc. cit., note 3, and W. J. GORDON. "Fair Use as
Market Failure", loc. cit., note 34, at 1605-1615.

90

Inthe discussion of duration that follows I am indebted to the work of Stanley
Liebowitz. See, e.g.,

S. J. LJEBOWITZ, lbc.

cit., note 32, at 183-188.

91

That is, the person who owns copyright in a particular book will have
monopoly over that book, but not over competing titles by other authors

92

The discussion here puts aside what Edmund Kitch calls "prospect effects,"
namely, those positive effects on ease of exploitation that can occur when

a
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Thus, one would credit the intellectual property system
with all the value of the works that would not have come into
existence without intellectual property rights. As to these works,
any production of the item would count as a positive value, and
restrictions on quantity would be irrelevant. Then, from this
aggregate positive value would be deducted the deadweight loss
in markets for works that would have been produced even in the
absence of intellectual property rights.9 3

-

The value of the intellectual property system is the net of
these two numbers. As Professor Stanley Liebowitz has made
clear,94 imposing system-wide durational limits - limiting how
long particular types of intellectual property rights will last
can serve to maximize this net value.
First, as duration increases, the number of new works
attributable to an additional period of protection will grow
smaller. The usual law of diminishing marginal utility would
seem to govern; as the duration of a copyright or patent is made
longer and longer, the incentive effect of additional length is
likely to decrease.9 5 To illustrate: extending the duration of
copyright from one year to five is likely to so increase the
expected rewards of writing a book or designing a poster that
the increase will induce some new works to be made which
would not otherwise be created. By contrast, extending the
duration from 101 years to 105 is not likely to have as strong an
effect, so such further extensions will bring less to the "plus"
side of the ledger.

property rights are centralized in one entity. See Edmund KITCH, "The
Nature and Function of the Patent System", (1977) 20 1. Law & Econ. 265.
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S. J LIEBOwITZ, loc.

cit., note 32.

187.
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His graphical representation is particularly helpful. See id. at
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This point is probably made most wittily by Lord Macaulay, in his speeches

before the British parliament protesting their extending the duration of
copyright. Lord Macaulay argued that while copyright might be necessary to
ensure a "supply of good books," the monopoly that it imposed was at best a
necessary evil. "For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the
evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing
the good " Thomas MACAULAY, "Speech Before the House of Commons"
(Feb. 5, 1841), in 8 The Works of Lord Macatlaty 195, 199 (Lady Trevelyan
ed. 1866) (discussing a bill which would have extended the duration of

copyright protection).
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Second, as duration increases, more and more works will
not "need" the extra years to come into existence. As the reader
will recall, years of protection that are not needed for incentives
constitute unnecessary restrictions, and as to them "deadweight
loss" should be counted on the debit side of the social ledger.
For example, works which were called into existence by the
promise of a 56-year reward are "pluses" to be credited to the
copyright system for only their first 56 years. The copyright
system's grant of exclusive rights for years 57 and following
would deserve no credit for those works' creation. Equally
importantly, any deadweight loss in markets in years 57 and
following becomes a cost attributable to copyright.
Thus, as duration grows longer, the incentive value of an
added durational restriction grows less, and the deadweight loss
grows larger. The economic goal in choosing a durational limit
is to maximize the difference between the two measures,
incentive value and deadweight loss. Thus, duration can be
custom-designed, providing a set of categorical sharp rules that
limit the periods of protection for intangibles protected by a
given regime, such as the seventeen to twenty years that U.S.
law gives to utility patents,", as compared with the fourteen
years of design patents,9 7 the "life plus seventy years" that
inheres in most copyrights," or the ten years of protection
applicable to semiconductor chip mask works." These various
systemic limits can function to minimize the cost attributable to
deadweight loss.

IV.

Using standards to minimize market
imperfections: turning to the fair use doctrine
and the question of parody

Sometimes markets do not evolve for a particular
creative work or use - say, for example, that bargaining is
impeded by problems such as externalities, or high transaction
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35 USC. Seetion 73,
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17 U.S C Sections '02-305. There is a different duration for works made for
hire, etc.
17 U SC. Section 904
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UC. Sections 154-157.
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costs in identifying or communicating with the copyright
proprietor. If the copyright laws prohibited copying in that area
it could simply be preventing copying without yielding creators
any monetary advantage. That would be undesirable. Not only
would copyright then fail to perform its primary function, but if
users cannot reach market deals with creators, copyright would
impose more costs and generate less benefit than would a
regime without copyright. For though incentives may be low in
a world without copyright, at least copyists and other users
would have access to whatever works happened to be created;
by contrast, in a world where there is copyright but no markets,
incentives are low and the public has no access. Therefore, as
discussed in the initial sections of this article, the ability of users
to form markets is crucial to copyright's economic mission of
encouraging the production and use of new work.
This observation has implications for policy in
individual cases. If a defendant faces market failure in the face
of copyright, then, in his case, the economic foundation for

copyright has crumbled. That is a good argument (if not a
complete one) for not enforcing the copyright against him.
Further, it can be argued that "fair use" has evolved as an
equitable response to market failure, to ensure that socially
desirable uses will not be blocked.' 0 0
For example, consider photocopying by individual
scholars. The transaction costs in contacting a copyright owner
for permission to photocopy might well outweigh the benefit the
scholar expects to reap.1 0 1 In such a case, enforcing the
copyright would merely eliminate the photocopying, rather than
generate any license fees for the copyright owner. In such an
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1 have

advanced this argument in W. J. GORDON. "Fair Use as Market

Failure",

loc. cit., note 34, 1614-1615, 1627-1641. For further development,

see id. at 1614-1657 (proposing a 3-part test for fair use, and comparing such
test with the case law results) and W. J. GORDON, Private Censorship, loc.
cit, note 1, 1042-1043 (1990) . See also, e.g., W. M. LANDES & R. A.
POSNER, loc. cit., note 32; Sheldon LIGHT, "Parody, Burlesque and the
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Economic Rationale for Copyright", (1979) 1 1 Conn. L_ Rev. 615.
That is, even if the scholar were willing and able to pay whatever price the
copyright owner demanded, the scholar might not be willing to both pay that
price plus bear the time delay, hassle, and secretarial costs involved in
securing a permission.
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event, 0 2 granting "fair use" treatment to the scholar will not
impair the copyright owner's potential income stream, and will
allow a socially beneficial use to go forward that the transaction
costs barrier would otherwise have blocked. High transaction
costs are, of course, a classic cause of market failure.
The market failure approach is consistent with the great
bulk of "fair use" precedent, 0 3 and in recent years this sort of
argument has even found its way into the courts' explicit
arguments. For example, in a recent fair use case involving
corporate photocopying of scientific journals, the courts clearly
had a market failure model in mind. The opinions of both the
District Court and Court of Appeals discuss what economists
identify as "transaction costs," and examine the extent to which
the defendant's employees if required to stop
photocopying - could find other avenues through which to
obtain the desired material.1 04
Similarly, in the most recent fair use case before the
Supreme Court, the opinion indicated that "fair use" can be
justified in part as a response to situations in which copyright
owners are unlikely to give permission at virtually any price.' 05
This position, advanced in a case involving a song parody,
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Note that this analysis is dependent upon the relative size of the applicable
transaction Cost barrier. If a clearinghouse or compulsory license system exists
which reduces the transaction costs, then the scholar may not require fair use
treatment in order to allow her use to go forward,
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See W. J, GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failure", or c-it., note 34, at 16271636
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See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp.
1992), aff'd, 60 F. 2d 93, 929-931 (2d Cir. 1994).
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See Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music Inc., supra, note 17 In assessing the
plaintiffs' claim that the parody would impair their potential market, the Court
responded: "[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license
critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from
the very notion of a potential licensing market" Id., at 592.

1 (S.D

N Y.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar point in FIsber v. Dees,
794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The parody defense to copyright infringement

exists precisely to make possible a use that generally cannot be bought"). For
other cases involving similar anti-dissemination motives on the part of
copyright proprietors, see W. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failure", loc.
cir., note 34, at 1632-1633.

COPYRIGHT AND PARODY

99

might strike the reader as inconsistent with the usual assumption
of neoclassical economics that one must take preferences as a

given.
If one takes this assumption seriously - it is sometimes
known as the assumption of "consumer sovereignty" - then it
seems the Court should have accorded to the copyright owner's
desire not to be parodied as much respect as any other value.
After all, in theory, an unwillingness to sell or license merely
indicates that the potential buyer/licensee is not the highestvalued user. And in many countries, such as Canada, an
unwillingness to allow one's work to be copied in a distorted
manner is given more, rather than less, respect than a refusal to
sell motivated by ordinary commercial reasons. 06
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Canada's moral rights statute is complex. Analysis can fruitfully begin at
Copyrighr Act, supra, note 19, section 14,1 (1985) (Can.) which provides:

"Moral rights
14.1 (1) The author of a work has, subject to section 28.2, the right to the
integrity of the work and, in connection with an act mentioned in section 3,
the right, where reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the
work as its author by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain

anonymous."
By contrast, the United States copyright law provides a right of integrity to
only a narrow class of visual artwork, usually originals. See 17 U.S.C. Section
106. The U.S. moral right is subject to "fair use" in a way that the Canadtan
moral right does not seem to he subject to "fair dealing."
To parody would be to distort, and, since it might very well injure an author's
reputation, might violate the Canadian moral right of integrity. The statute
provides:

"Nature of right of integrity
28.2 (1) The author's right to the integrity of a work is infringed only if the
work is, to the prejudice of the honour or reputation of the author,
(a) distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified; or
fb) used in association with a product, service, cause or institution.
Where prejudice deemed
(2) In the case of a painting, sculpture or engraving, the prejudice referred
to in subsection (1) shall be deemed to have occurred as a result of any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work.

When work not distorted, etc.
(3) For the purposes

of this section,
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So it may seem wrongheaded of the United States
Supreme Court to suggest that it may be appropriate to give a
parodist - a disappointed licensee - the liberty to copy for
free on the ground that the owner would not sell him a license.
Is the Court under-valuing the owner's preferences? Not
necessarily; there are several explanations of the Court's
approach that are consistent with the traditional economic
deference to individual preferences. In fact, economics suggests
that a rule like Canada's that defers to an author's copyright or
her supposed "moral right of integrity" will yield results that are
(administrative costs aside) inferior to a case-by-case approach
which tolerates some parodies however insulting the
parodies might be to an artist whose work is being intentionally
distorted and mocked.
Canada, like the United States, gives fair use or fair
dealing to works of criticism or review. I shall argue that
parodies fall into the same analytic class, and should be treated
similarly.
When a copyright owner refuses to let someone adapt
her work for purposes of parodying it, or refuses to give an
ideological opponent permission to quote lengthy passages, or
insists on suing anyone who quotes passages of her memoirs
that reflect unfavorably on her, she is using her copyright as a
tool of suppression. 0 The question of whether authors should
be entitled to refuse permission to those users of whom they

(a) a change in the location of a work, the physical means by which a work

is exposed or the physical structure containing a work, or
(b) steps taken in good faith to restore or preserve the work shall not, by
that act alone, constitute a distortion, mutilation or other modification of the
work"
R.S.. 1985, c. 10 (4th Supp.), s' C"
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Similar instances also appear in the corporate realm. For example, when a
newspaper expanded its TV coverage it told its readership about the extended
service in an advertisement that pictured a copyrighted TV Guide cover for
purposes of comparison. TV Guide then sued for copyright infringement.
Presumably the suit was motivated by sormething other than a desire for
license fees. The comparative advertising was held to be a fair use. See
Triangle Publications Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers Inc, 626 F. Supp.

1 171 (5th Cir. 1980).
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disapprove is a complex one.'"' On which side of the issue
would economics weigh in? If the proper way to look at these
problems is economic, then, as mentioned, the principles of
consumer sovereignty would seem to dictate that governmental
decision-makers should not question why someone refuses to
sell or license. Economics "assum[es] that man is a rational
maximizer of his ends in life,"" and a desire to suppress would
seem to be as rational an end as a desire for fame or fast cars.
Additionally, Ronald Coase has persuasively
emphasized the importance of transaction costs by showing that,
in their absence, the ultimate allocation of a resource will be
efficient regardless of how entitlements are initially assigned.' 0
So long as the parties can meet face to face, as in copyright a
copyright owner and potential parodist or critic could often do,
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For example, it can be difficult to distinguish suppression from an attempt to
direct the work into the most valuable derivative work markets. See, e.g., Paul
GOLDSTEIN, Copyright, Vol. I, at 571-573 (rights over derivative works can
affect the direction of investment and the type of works produced).
Similarly, in regard to unpublished works, it can be difficult to distinguish
cases of suppression from cases of economically motivated refusals to license.
An author accused of suppression may be simply trying to keep the work out
of the public eye temporarily until it reaches its mature form and can be

published.
Even if some practical means existed to distinguish all dissembling
"suppressors" from those copyright owners who are genuinely motivated by
financial return, some cases will present instances of truly mixed motives. For
example, the owner of copyright in an out-of-print collection of letters might

sue a biographer who extensively quotes the letters, not only out of a dislike
for the biographer's message or perceived inaccuracies, but also out of a
desire to preserve the reprint market for the letters. See ldeeropol v. Ni.er,
417 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 520 F. 2d 1061

(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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Richard A. POSNER, Economic Analysis of Law, 3d ed., 1986.
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See R. H. COASE, "The Problem of Social Cost", loc. cit., note 83. The
Coase Theorem is effective at least in the absence of factors such as
transaction costs, wealth or income effects, and strategic behavior. See Id.
(transaction costs). See also, e g., Donald REGAN, "The Problem of Social
Cost Revisited", (1972) 15 1. Law & Econ. 427 (strategic behavior). Compare

Ronald H. COASE, "Notes on the Problem of Social Cost", in The Firm, the
Market, and the Law, Chicago, University Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 157, 170174 (suggesting that income effects are unlikely to be significant, at least in
contexts not involving irreplaceable goods).
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why should there be any need for the judiciary to do anything
but enforce whatever property right is before it?
Whether suppression would or would not be
economically desirable will depend in most cases on empirical
analysis of the particular fact pattern.'I' But some general
observations can indicate preliminarily why, when copyright
owners seek to use the copyright law to avoid criticism or
ridicule, neither consumer sovereignty nor the Coase Theorem
suggest that judges should give the owners formal deference." 2
At least four reasons suggest that the market cannot
always be relied upon to mediate attempts at suppression and
that it might be economically desirable to refuse authors an
entitlement to suppress." 3 The four reasons are the "suppression
triangle"; pecuniary effects; managerial discretion; and
endowment effects. The four reasons are interrelated, and to
explicate them let me begin with the "suppression triangle."
In all these examples, remember: so long as there is the
possibility that the social interest will be better served by
refusing to enforce the owner's copyright, an economic case is
made for using a nonformal, reasonableness mode of inquiry.
One would then need to compare the costs of the extra
suppression that would result from adhering to a formal proowner result, with the administrative and other costs that would

I11

Even if one interprets copyright's economic goal as being solely the use of
incentives to "promote knowledge," so that satisfying the copyright owner's
personal tastes would not count as an independent value, the empirical answer
to suppression questions would not be easy: in a given case enforcing any
particular type of suppression would both keep some knowledge secret, and

yield

long-term incentives that could aid knowledge in the long run (because

authors who can suppress have a copyright worth more than authors who
cannot). Cf, Frank I. MICHELMAN, "Property, Utility & Fairness", (1967)
80 Harv. L Rev. 1 165 (the effects of demoralization on productivity). Which
of the two potential effects on knowledge would be greater (the loss from
enforcing suppression or the gain from long-term incentives) cannot be

determined a priar.
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For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Wendy J. GORDON, "The Right Not
to Use" (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).

the potential nonmonetizability of first
J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market Failure", oc,

Additional reasons might include, e.g,
amendment values. See W.
cir., note 34, at 1631-1632.
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be necessary in employing a "reasonableness" or "fairness"
standard. In the United States, with its strong history of prizing
free speech, the costs of improper suppression of news or
cultural material is viewed as very high.

Suppression Triangle

A.

I use the term "suppression triangle"1 4 to point to the
fact that in cases involving the suppression of information or
other intellectual products," 5 at least three parties are affected:
(1) the person who seeks or threatens to make the contested use
(for example, the potential parodist), (2) the copyright owner
who wants to keep the material from being copied or adapted
(the potential suppressor), and (3) the person or persons who
would want to see the material (the potential recipients). This is
the triangle of affected interests. Yet in the suppression
transaction typically only two parties are present: the potential
user (such as a parodist), and the copyright owner. Whether an
attempt to suppress is likely to be value-maximizing will
depend, inter alia, on how well the interest of the omitted third
party, the class of potential recipients, is represented by the two
immediate participants.
Theoretically, the more valuable the parody or other use
is to the public, the more the public should be willing to pay for
it, and the more the parodist should be willing and able to bid
for permission. Thus, the notion of the Invisible Hand expects
that any market participant will be in a position to reflect the
interests of affected third parties (that is, the public audience).
Nevertheless, the Invisible Hand often falters, and the
possibility of misallocation remains.
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T base this theory in part on the work of James Lindgren in the blackmail area.
See James LINDGREN, "Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail", (1984) 84
Colum, L. Rev. 670 (discussing the three-party structure involved). For an
economic analysis of blackmail stressing other aspects of blackmail activity,
see Ronald H. COASE, "The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail", (1988) 74
Va. L Rev. 655, 673-674.

I

am indebted to Warren Schwartz for suggesting the potential relevance of

the blackmail literature to this problem.
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Information can implicate different issues from literary expression and other
intellectual products; for purposes of this very general discussion, however, I

shall group all together under the rubric "information."
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Consider a hypothetical novelist or movie maker who
wants to keep the world from knowing what a hostile critic or
parodist has to say about his work. Assume also that the critic or
parodist wants to quote from the work or use its imagery, and
that use of the quotation or imagery is somehow essential to the
comprehensibility or believability of the criticism or parody.]t)
If the law required the critic or parodist to purchase licenses to
quote or paraphrase, how sure could we be that the "highestvalued" use would ensue?
For purposes of mathematical example, assume that the
critic or parodist stands to earn at most a thousand dollars profit
from even the best-written product. Assume that the novelist or
film-maker would lose fifty thousand if the criticism or parody
is published. Since the copyright owner would charge at least
fifty thousand for a license to criticize or ridicule his work and
the critic or parodist stands to gain only one thousand from
publishing, it may look like the copyright owner holds the
"highest valued" use when compared with the parodist or critic.
But that may be an illusion resulting from the fact that the third
party (in the owner/user/public triangle) is not being counted as
part of the deal.

The publishing of the review or parody might benefit the
public (who would thus be warned off from, let's say, a muchhyped romance novel that doesn't really excite anyone who
reads past page five) to the tune of that same fifty thousand, or
perhaps even more. On these hypothesized facts, requiring the
publisher to buy a license from someone who would not sell it is
a bad idea, and giving the publisher (the critic or parodist) free
use is a good idea. And both are consistent with economic
measures of value. If the critic had been able to capture the full
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There is another factor that may be at work here as well: the idea/expression
dichotomy. Since under current law copyright owners cannot prevent others
from using their ideas, it could be argued that little suppression of note could
occur; it might be suggested that a critic deprived of the privilege to quote
could nevertheless communicate effectively.
For simplicity's sake, therefore, assume that in the following examples,
whatever the defendant has taken from the first artist's work could be
considered copyrightable expression rather than simply "idea" and that the use
of the copyrighted expression is somehow essential to the effectiveness of the
planned derivative work.
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value that the review gave to the audience, then the novelist's
fifty thousand minimum asking price would have been met.
A parodist may similarly be unable to capture the full
value that the work holds for the audience. This can occur for
many reasons." 7 There may be significant positive externalities
and surplus in the market for parodies, for example. There also
may be other complications in the markets for reviews and
parodies, such as pecuniary losses that diverge from societal
economic losses.

B.

Pecuniary losses

Much of the loss that can come from a critical review
will often be merely pecuniary, reflecting not a net loss to
society but rather a shifting of revenues from one novelist to
another and possibly better one." 8 It is as if the triangle now
were a geometric figure with four points (the criticized novelist,
the critic, the public, and the better novelist). If one could add to
the price offered for the "license to criticize" an amount
reflecting the monies that the better novelist would reap, it
might be enough to make the difference. Since this cannot
happen," 9 mere pecuniary losses may take on an importance
they should not have and they might prevent socially desirable
licensing.
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As economist Michael L. Katz writes of the similar problem in the research

and development area:
"In the absence of perfect discrimination, the firm conducting the R & D
will be unable to appropriate all of the surplus generated by the licensing of
its R & D, and the firm will sell its R & D results at prices that lead to

inefficiently low levels of

utilization by other firms."

Michael L. KATZ, "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development",
(1986) 4 Rand J[ Econ. 527, 527,
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See Richard A. POSNER, "Conventionalist Defenses of Law as an

Autonomous Discipline" (September 21, 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the University of Chicago Law Review) (using pecuniary effects to
explain why landowners who create certain positive spillovers are not entitled
to payment from those who benefited).

119

Journalistic ethics undoubtedly prohibit reviewers from accepting subsidies
for doing hostile reviews.
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Managerial discretion

Another possible complication has to do not with the
potential buyer's inability to raise the appropriate amount of
capital, but with the potential licensor's potential inability to
know even a good deal when it comes along. This complication
I will label managerial discretion,' 2 0 by which I mean to
embrace all those things that may make managers in complex
corporations sometimes arrive at decisions that are less valuemaximizing than they could be. I would include here, for
example, personal risk aversion, bureaucratic structure, group
dynamics, and laziness.' 2 ' Thus, the officials of a company that
owns a given copyright may refuse to license simply because
the license is in an unfamiliar field and their particular
bureaucratic structure penalizes unlucky risk takers more than it
rewards lucky ones. When critical, parodic, or otherwise
controversial licenses would be at issue, the human desire to
"play it safe" might prevent value-maximizing transfers from
occurring.1 2 2 Managerial discretion is just one of many agency
problems that can prevent the parties from dealing with each
other like the unitary participants in the classic Coasian
transaction.

D.

Endowment or wealth effects: pricelessness

All of the above are reasons why socially desirable
"licenses to be critical" are not likely to be granted if left solely
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There is a fairly extensive literature on the controversial question of whether
managerial discretion exists and if so what impact it has and what should be
done about it; all I mean to suggest here is the simple possibility that
managers in complex corporations do not always make the same decisions

that an individual owner of a business would.
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In an individual, a taste for risk or laziness might be a legitimate part of her
utility curve, but a manager is supposed to act unselfishly on the part of the
corporation. There is a large literature on these agency problems.
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It might be argued that tastes for laziness or risk aversion are simply
preferences that deserve the same respect under the notion of consumer
sovereignty as other desires. However, we are not talking here about the risk
aversion or laziness of the copyright owner, but of some person who is
fortuitously placed within the licensor organization to be able to control
licensing decisions, Whether gratifying such a person's taste in regard to
laziness or risk serves greater economic ends (as, e.g., a forrm of
compensation) is itself complex.
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to the devices of copyright owners.'2 3 One additional and
probably most important factor remains to be discussed: the
difference between willingness to pay and willingness to sell,
sometimes identified with "endowment" or "wealth" effects.124
The concept here basically refers to the fact that giving
someone an entitlement makes that person richer, and this may
change how the holder values both the entitlement and other
resources, and this in turn may affect how entitlements are
eventually allocated once bargaining between that person and
other persons is completed.t'2 Wealth effects do not retard
resources from moving to hands in which, given a particular
entitlement starting-point, they have the highest-valued use. Nor
are they often strong enough to make a difference; in instances
where fungible commodities are sold in markets populated by
many buyers and sellers, "buy" prices and "sell" prices probably
tend to converge. But, when wealth effects do have an impact,
they have the potential of rendering the meaning of "highestvalued" use indeterminate in the sense that the location of the
highest-valued use is not independent of the law. Where wealth
effects are strong, everything depends on the legal assignment
26
As a
of entitlements that form the transaction's starting point.'

23

Of course, such licenses might be granted; I offer here only an abstract

analysis which would need to be empirically verified.

124

Wealth effects are, roughly, the impact on one's preferences brought about by
a change in wealth, including the change brought about by being given, or
being denied, an entitlement. See, e.g., E.J. MISHAN, "The Postwar

Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay", (1971) 9 J. Econ.
Lireralure 1 (the allocative impact of wealth effects illustrated at
though not explicitly in the context of the Coase theorem).

125

18-21,

For an excellent numerical example, see id. at 18-21. It is well recognized that
a divergence often exists between the price that a potential buyer would be
willing to pay for a resource he does not own, and the price that the same
person would demand before he would sell that same resource if the law had

initially awarded its ownership to him. What is less clear is what terminology,
explanations, and characterizations are best employed for discussing the
phenomenon. For a valuable discussion suggesting, inter alia, that traditional

"wealth effects" do not fully explain divergence between willingness-toaccept and willingness-io-pay, see Elizabeth HOFFMAN & Matthew
SPITZER, "willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept; Legal and
Economic Implications", (1993) 71 Wash. UL.Q. 59.
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For a dramatic hypothetical example, see Alfred C. YEN, "Restoring the
Natural Law; Copyright as Labor and Possession", (1990) 51 Ohio St. L.
491, 518-519 ("flip flop" of rights).
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result, in such cases the search for the highest-valued use cannot
provide a good basis for assigning initial entitlements.
Professor Coase showed that in a world without
transaction costs, resources will be traded to their highestvalued uses, so that, as between any two users of a resource, if
A can use the resource more productively than B, A will end up
with it.127 Therefore, many scholars argue, in a real world full of
transaction costs that can impede bargaining, it often makes
sense to "mimic the market"1=s and assign legal rights to the
highest-valued user in the first instance. This is a core insight of
Law and Economics.
Yet the Law and Economics argument largely depends
on there being a stable highest-valued user' 2 " The injunction to
"seek efficiency by mimicking the perfect market" only makes
normative sense if the perfect market allocation is a constant. If
the allocation of rights significantly affects the monetary
valuation that parties place on a resource, then there may be no
stable economic reality for the law to seek to mimic.
There is indeed a rare class of goods which lack this
stability. These are the precious, personal, irreplaceable, crucial
goods one thinks of as "priceless." Examples are many: the
Dead Sea Scrolls; family heirlooms; one's children; one's
health; one's reputation; one's peace of mind. The monetary
value a person places on one of these goods may well depend on
whether the person has a legal entitlement to it (whether she
"owns" it) or whether she must purchase it.
Consider health, for example. It is plausible that most
people would be unwilling to sell their organs at any price, so
that Jane Smith might turn down an offer of five million dollars
from Billionaire X for one of her kidneys. Similarly, if Jane
Smith has kidney failure and one of her dying relatives wills her
a healthy kidney, she might well be unwilling to take the

127

See R. H. COASE, oc. cit., note 83.

[28

See, e.g., G. CALABRESI & A, D. MELAMED, Inc. cit., note
classic explanation of market-mimicry.

129

61, for a

For further exploration, and for citation to relevant literattre, see E,
HOFFMAN & M. SPITZER, loc. cit., note 125.
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billionaire's five million dollars in exchange for her entitlement
to it. If so, Jane Smith looks like the kidney's "highest-valued

user."
But should she have no entitlement to the kidney from
the recently-deceased person (perhaps because the relevant
jurisdiction does not recognize such bequests as enforceable),
Jane Smith's own budget and health insurance will place a limit
on how much she can spend pursuing the transplant. It is highly
unlikely she will be able to outbid Billionaire X for the kidney.
If so, Billionaire X will appear to be the "highest-valued user."
One can draw from such a pattern no reliable information about
whether the resource has its highest value in the hands of the
billionaire or Jane Smith. This phenomenon might be called the
"pricelessness effect," and its presence may be one reason why
our society resists giving private ownership in body parts and
other items that are "priceless" in this sense,
The pricelessness effect is a subset of the category that
economists call "endowment effects" which in turn is related to
wealth effects: since assigning an entitlement to someone makes
that person wealthier, it can affect the valuation the person puts
on resources. Often a person's "willingness to buy" price will

differ significantly from the price at which she is "willing to
sell". 30i Many people hedge the Coase Theorem by noting it
does not apply when significant wealth or endowment effects
are present. But usually the wealth or endowment effect is so
minor that it does not impair the reliability of using a market
mimicry approach to model efficiency.''
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Experimental evidence on this point has been collected by Matthew Spitzer
and others.
The impact of endowment or wealth effects is sometimes exaggerated. See R.
H. COASE, "Notes on the Problem of Social Cost", lo,. cit., note 110, at 170174 (discussing arguments re the presumed effect of changes in legal position
on the distribution of wealth and on the allocation of resources).
Professor Coase argues that the impact of wealth effects can be overstated
because, among other things, if the legal rules are known in advance, the
prices of applicable resources will likely alter in a way that minimizes such
effects; in addition, he suggests, contractual provision for contingencies may
be available to mitigate some changes in legal rules. See id., at 157. See also

id, at 170-174. Neither of these devices are likely to eliminate the wealth
in the context of authorial suppression of

effect - here "pricelessness" embarrassing criticism, however.
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The "pricelessness effect" deserves having its own name
precisely because the subcategory of effects it denotes are likely
to be significant. The "pricelessness effect" comes into play
when the entitlement at issue pertains to a good that (1) an
individual or group values very highly and (2) which is virtually
irreplaceable, and (3) when it is the allocation of that very
good' which is at issue. As to such items, the initial placement
of the entitlement is likely to have a sharp effect on the price
and allocation of the resource, even in the absence of transaction

costs.

In cases of parody or criticism - both areas where "fair
use" treatment tends to be awarded to defendants - reputation
may be at issue. To many, reputation is priceless in the sense we
have been discussing. For example, a novelist who fears that a
journalist will use extensive quotations from her book to bolster
a hostile review will be most unlikely to sell the journalist a
license to copy those quotations - regardless of the price
offered. But that does not mean the author's preference is the
"highest-valued use" in any meaningful sense, since that same
author may be unable to buy silence if the law gives the
journalist a "fair use" liberty right to publish. A similar analysis
can be made of parody: since most people intensely dislike
being ridiculed, the legal right may determine where the
33
highest-valued use lies.m
In such cases, the market is nearly
useless as a guide', and formal deference to owners' market
powers is inappropriate.
For example, assume A is a novelist, a copyright owner
who has an entitlement not to license and who is otherwise
financially comfortable; she has perhaps $4 000 in the bank and
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That is, while I predict that the law's assignment of rights in organs is likely to
have a distinct effect on a kidney's allocation, it is a more complex question
whether the law's assignment of rights in organs will have much of an effect
on the allocation of other resources.
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These points are also explored in w. J. GORDON, "Private Censorship", loc.
cii note 1, at 1042-1043; also see w. J. GORDON, "Fair Use as Market
Failure", loc. cit., note 34, at 1632-1636 (anti-dissemination motives),
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However, if the market were to yield the same result under either allocation of
the legal right, then that result could he used as a guide at least to where lies
the highest economic value (that is, value as measured hyahility and
willingness

to pay).
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a two-year old car and a prospect of steady royalties. A may be
tempted by B's offer of, say, S 10 000 for a license to use her
work, but she can afford to say no without altering her lifestyle.
If B's project is an ordinary commercial project and A will not
be sacrificing more than $ 10 000 from foregoing alternative
uses of the work, she will probably license. (It might also
happen that B's project would not require an exclusive license
and would not otherwise interfere with A's other licensing
opportunities. If so, granting B permission to go forward would
have no opportunity cost at all for A. She would be even more
likely to license such a use.) However, if B's project is hostile
toward A's work, A may well refuse the license, either to
protect her long-term economic interest (which may be a mere
pecuniary loss, remember), her aesthetic reputation, or her
feelings.
If however the law gave novelist A no entitlement to
prevent B's use, then she would have to persuade B not to
publish (cf., blackmail payments.) The most she could offer B to
persuade B not to make the critical use planned is the amount in
her bank account, plus whatever she could sell her car for, plus
whatever she could borrow on the strength of her expected
royalty stream. The total may well be less than $ 10 000, and A
will probably demand a price in excess of $ 10 000. Give A the
entitlement and the highest-valued use of the contested
expression is in her hands; give B the entitlement and the
highest-valued use is in that licensee's hands. The locus of the
"highest-valued use" has shifted as a result of where the law
places its entitlement.

In such cases, looking to the results of consensual
transactions will not give us any information about who
"should" have the right.
Another way to put the point is this:' 35 Economics is
sometimes used as a normative guide for good social policy.
When it is used in this fashion, its primary claim to legitimacy
stems from the links between economics and utilitarianism) 3 6
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1 am indebted here to Alan Feld.
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This belief is rather controversial. See, e.g., such classic sources on the debate
as the "Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern", (1980) 8 Hofsrra L
Rev. 485 and Richard A. POSNER, The Economics of Justice (1987) for
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The more that income distribution restricts the expression of
individuals' preferences, the more shaky the link between
economics and utility becomes. This linkage has the potential
for completely breaking down in cases of "pricelessness."
Though in such cases the parties' preferences may remain
constant, both in their objects and in their intensity, a shift in
who owns the entitlement may effectively disable one of those
parties from effectuating that preference. Thus a legal regime
that is committed (even in part) to utilitarian consequentialism
would be unwise to rely upon a money-bound market model for
normative guidance in cases of pricelessness.
In sum, refusing to allow a copyright owner to suppress
a hostile use of the copyrighted work, in a case where the
"pricelessness effect" is likely to make a determinative
difference, does not necessarily contravene economic principles.
In such an instance, it is appropriate for even an economicallyoriented court to refuse to defer to the copyright owner, and
instead make an individualized weighing of how enforcing the
copyright in the given instance would affect welfare, and any
other relevant consequentialist or nonconsequentialist policies.

Conclusion
This essay has examined the dynamics behind the key
systemic choice made by copyright law, which is to reverse the
presumption of Restitution law that people who refrain from
crossing others' tangible boundaries are free to take advantage
of each other's labor. In intellectual property law, this
presumptive freedom is replaced by a duty not to copy. Such a
duty impels potential copyists to identify themselves and seek
contracts with authors and other creators. In this way, the
authors are given monetary incentives to continue creating, and
works are disseminated to the public. However, all this comes at
a significant price: some people will not have access to works
for which they would be willing to pay the marginal cost of
production. This loss of access is particularly significant

further discussion of the question of whether utilitarianism and economics are
truly linked in this way.
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because the works may not be simply fungible goods, but may
be irreplaceable, unique, and important artifacts crucial to
comprehending and participating in a culture.
In order to keep access open to the most important
cultural components, copyright law allows judges to declare that
something constitutes an "idea" and is therefore not ownable.
This flexible if muddy concept keeps the private property
system permeable to the society's changing preferences
regarding commodification.
"Ideas" are not ownable at all. But some cultural
artifacts must be owned, if authors are to have incentives in a
world without extensive subsidy. Given the high costs of an
erroneous judgment to privatize, U.S. copyright law provides,
inter alia, two standards that provide liberty, particularly to
members of the public who make creative use of others'
copyrighted work. These two standards are "substantial
similarity" and "fair use." Both allow some copying of
expression, particularly by persons who add a great deal of their
own talents to what has been copied, transforming the originals.
-

Canada's treatment of certain transformative users
namely, parodists - is significantly different from that of the
U.S. Many explanations present themselves. One is the United
States' romance with free speech. We value the iconoclast more
than do most nations. 7 But another obvious explanation is that
in each country copyright may serve a different purpose. In the
U.S., the Constitution explicitly grants Congress power to pass
copyright and patent laws to serve a public purpose, namely,
furthering of the "progress of science and the useful arts."s
Canada's copyright law may follow more of a continental
model, in which authors' rights stand on their own as a valid
reason for copyright. Given Canada's dual heritage, from
England and France, it seems likely that Canada would be more
inclined than would the U.S. toward the French traditions of
honoring the droit d'auteur. 3 9
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Steven H. SHIFFRIN, The First Amendment, Democracy and Romance,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990.
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U. S. Const. Art 1, cl. 8.
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1 have suggested elsewhere that even an "authors' rights" approach would
yield far less protection to authors than do current copyright statutes, see W. J.
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But to the extent Canada is aiming at maximizing public
benefit, and to the extent that economics is a reliable guide to
that benefit, this essay has suggested that an automatic
deference to authors over parodists cannot be justified.

GORDON, "Property Right in Self-Expression", loc, cit, note 54. Admittedly,
in that essay I was operating out of an Scottish/English "natural rights"
traditiOn rather than a Continental one.
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